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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Justice Kennedy remarked that “Federalism was our Nation’s own 
discovery.  The Framers split the atom of sovereignty.”3  It is a 
wonderful metaphor.  “Atom” comes from the Greek átomos 
(indivisible),4 and early political philosophers insisted sovereignty was 
similarly indivisible.5  When a neutron strikes an atom of the uranium 
isotope U235, typically the collision produces one barium atom, one 
krypton atom and three neutrons.6  A variety of other fission products 
are possible, however.7  Justice Kennedy’s metaphor is apt in that 
respect also, because the fission products of sovereignty in the United 
States are often typical,8  but sometimes notably atypical, and that is the 
heart of what is known as “the Erie problem.”9 
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins10 definitively abandoned the natural 
law approach that had dominated legal discourse until the rise of legal 
positivism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.11  Swift v. 
 
 3. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).   
 4. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 751 (2d ed. 1989).   
 5. See generally DONALD L. DOERNBERG, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OR THE RULE OF LAW:  
THE NEW FEDERALISM’S CHOICE 13-63 (2005). 
 6. RAYMOND A. SERWAY & JERRY S. FAUGHN, COLLEGE PHYSICS 972 (4th ed. 1995); 
JOSEPH A. MULLIGAN, INTRODUCTORY COLLEGE PHYSICS 845 (1985).  The neutrons are available 
to shatter other U235 atoms in what will become a chain reaction if there is a critical mass.  See 
NIGEL SAUNDERS, URANIUM AND THE RARE EARTH METALS 44 (2004); GREGORY R. CIOTTONE, 
DISASTER MEDICINE 519 (3d ed. 2006). 
 7. SERWAY & FAUGHN, supra note 6; MULLIGAN, supra note 6. 
 8. See infra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. 
 9. Used this way, the phrase refers to all circumstances in which a court must choose 
between applying state or federal law to an issue.  Common conflict-of-laws terminology denotes a 
vertical choice of law as one between state and federal law.  See Joseph P. Bauer, The Erie Doctrine 
Revisited:  How a Conflicts Perspective Can Aid the Analysis, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1235, 1236 
(1999).  A choice of law made from among state or foreign laws is a horizontal choice of law.  Id.   
In a justly famous article, Professor Ely complained that use of that term “has served to make a 
major mystery out of what are really three distinct and rather ordinary problems of statutory and 
constitutional interpretation.”  John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 
698 (1974).  (It is not clear whether it is a capital offense to write an article about vertical choice-of-
law doctrine without citing Ely, but it is at least a felony.)  Nonetheless, the terms “Erie problem” 
and “Erie doctrine” customarily refer to the entire vertical choice-of-law enterprise, and it has 
gotten too late in the day to expect successful recharacterization as “the vertical choice-of-law 
problem.”  
 10. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 11. Donald L. Doernberg, The Unseen Track of Erie Railroad:  Why History and 
Jurisprudence Suggest a More Straightforward Form of Erie Analysis, 109 W. VA. L. REV. 611, 
617-21 (2007) 
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Tyson,12 Erie’s predecessor, rested on the notion that the common law 
was objective and external to the human process of creating law.  “In the 
ordinary use of language, it will hardly be contended, that the decisions 
of courts constitute laws.   They are, at most, only evidence of what the 
laws are, and are not, of themselves, laws.”13  Common law judges did 
not create common law; they discovered it.14  This view of common law 
led Swift to hold that federal courts sitting in diversity were free to 
discover general common law principles; the Rules of Decision Act15 
did not require them to follow the states’ views of what the common law 
was.  Thus, common law was not the law of any state within the 
meaning of RDA.  But it was not federal law either.16  It was what the 
 
 12. 41 U.S. 1 (1842). 
 13. Id. at 18. 
 14. As Professor Nockleby put it: 
In Blackstone's era, judicial rule-making was legitimated by the mythology that law 
judges were “oracles”, [1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69], whose 
pronouncements derived as though from a sacred text.  To the 18th-century mind, judges 
“discovered” law, or at most drew upon existing principles.  “In theory. . . judges drew 
their decisions from existing principles of law; ultimately these principles reflected the 
living values, attitudes, and ethical ideas of the English people.”  It took Holmes and the 
Realists a half-century to dislodge from lawyers’ minds the notion that in common law 
adjudication judges merely “discovered” and “applied” law. 
John T. Nockleby, Access to Justice:  Law and Popular Culture:  Introduction, 40 LOYOLA L.A. L. 
REV. 539, 543 n.12 (2007) (quoting Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law 21 (2d ed. 
1985)).  See also Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Interpretation and the Problem of History, 63 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 928 (1988) (“Of course, the idea that common law judges do make law was 
not generally accepted before this century, and the fiction that judges discovered eternal legal 
principles served to obscure the obvious tension between the tasks of statutory interpretation and 
common law adjudication.”); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System:  The 
Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION:  FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 10 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (referring to the 
1780s, “when the prevailing image of the common law was that of a preexisting body of rules, 
uniform throughout the nation (rather than different from state to state), that judges merely 
‘discovered’ rather than created.”). 
 15. The Rules of Decision Act (hereinafter “RDA”) was in the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 
§ 34, 1 Stat. 92:  “The laws of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties, or statutes 
of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials 
at common law in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply.”  It is little changed 
today.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006). 
 16. If it had been, the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, would have compelled the 
states to apply it in their own courts.  “Just as federal courts are constitutionally obligated to apply 
state law to state claims . . . , so too the Supremacy Clause imposes on state courts a constitutional 
duty ‘to proceed in such manner that all the substantial rights of the parties under controlling federal 
law [are] protected.’”  Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 151 (1988) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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courts called “general law,”17 a third category of law neither state nor 
federal.18  
Legal positivism had a different view.  John Austin had said that 
law was nothing more than the command of the sovereign,19 and Justice 
Holmes famously admonished:  “The common law is not a brooding 
omnipresence in the sky, but the articulate voice of some sovereign or 
quasi-sovereign that can be identified. . . .”20  Erie eliminated the 
category of general law, leaving only state and federal law to govern in 
the United States.  Justice Brandeis’s declaration that “There is no 
federal general common law”21 was the death knell of natural law theory 
in the United States.22  Unfortunately, Erie left difficult problems in its 
wake. 
 
 17. See, e.g., Swift, 41 U.S. at 18 (referring to “the general commercial law”); Erie R.R. Co. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 70, 74 (1938). 
 18. In Erie, Justice Brandeis noted that under Swift, “the impossibility of discovering a 
satisfactory line of demarcation between the province of general law and that of local law developed 
a new well of uncertainties.”  304 U.S. at 74.  As a practical solution, Erie leaves much to be 
desired, because it created many difficulties of its own.  See infra notes 29-50 and accompanying 
text. 
 19. JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 3-25 (R. Campbell ed., 1879).  Blackstone 
anticipated (one might even say articulated) the positivist thesis:  “Municipal law, thus understood 
[as distinct from the law of nature, the revealed law and the law of nations] is properly defined to be 
a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a state, commanding what is right and 
prohibiting what is wrong.”  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *44.  See also id. at *46 
(recognizing the legislature as the supreme power in a state:  “Sovereignty and legislature are indeed 
convertible terms.”). 
 20. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1916) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 21. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (emphasis added). 
 22. As Justice Frankfurter observed in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York: 
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins did not merely overrule a venerable case.  It overruled a 
particular way of looking at law which dominated the judicial process long after its 
inadequacies had been laid bare. . . .  Law was conceived as a “brooding omnipresence” 
of Reason, of which decisions were merely evidence and not themselves the controlling 
formulations.  Accordingly, federal courts deemed themselves free to ascertain what 
Reason, and therefore Law, required wholly independent of authoritatively declared 
State law, even in cases where a legal right as the basis for relief was created by State 
authority and could not be created by federal authority and the case got into a federal 
court merely because it was “between Citizens of different States. . . .”  
326 U.S. 99, 101-02 (1945) (citations omitted).  See also Terry S. Kogan, A Neo-Federalist Tale of 
Personal Jurisdiction, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 257, 348 (1990) (referring to Erie’s “death blow”). 
  Courts and commentators seem regularly to overstate Brandeis.  See, e.g., Shady Grove 
Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1460-61 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(“The . . . Rules of Decision Act prohibits federal courts from generating substantive law in 
diversity actions.” (footnotes omitted)); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965) (“The broad 
command of Erie was therefore identical to that of the Enabling Act:  federal courts are to apply 
state substantive law and federal procedural law.”); Marc A. Thurmon, Confusion Codified:  Why 
Trademark Remedies Make No Sense, 17 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 245, 296 n. 243 (2010) (“Many years 
ago the Supreme Court held and has recently repeated that there is no Federal common law.”).  See 
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Erie spawned an extended line of Supreme Court cases, too 
numerous for useful citation here,23 grappling with the proper scope of 
state and federal law.  In Erie itself, the solution was relatively easy.  
Implicitly noting that the case had aspects of both tort and property 
law,24 Justice Brandeis declared,  
Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law 
applicable in a state whether they be local in their nature or “general,” be 
they commercial law or a part of the law of torts.  And no clause in the 
Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts.25  
There was no constitutional predicate for a federal law of torts or 
property, so state law applied by default.26  “Substantive” took on 
enormous significance in the development of the doctrine, because it 
raised the problem of what was substantive and what was procedural.  It 
is old learning that, as a general rule, state substantive law and federal 
procedural law apply in diversity cases,27 but that simple statement begs 
the question of the distinction between substantive and procedural law 
and masks exceptions.28 
 
generally Craig Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth, 96 CAL. L. REV. 595, 595 (2008) (referring to “the 
widespread illusion that, after Erie, ‘there is no federal common law.’” (footnote and citations 
omitted)).  Supreme Court Justices have even been known to yield to the temptation.  See Shady 
Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1461 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that RDA “directs federal courts, in 
diversity cases, to apply state law when failure to do so would invite forum-shopping and yield 
markedly disparate results . . .”).  Even Justice Brandeis overstated Brandeis, Erie itself (“[e]xcept 
in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any 
case is the law of the State,”  Erie, 304 U.S. at 78), as subsequent developments demonstrated.  See 
Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988) and Banco Nacional de Cuba, 376 U.S. 398 
(1964).  See infra note 28. 
 23. The most commonly cited and probably best known cases are Gasperini v. Ctr. for 
Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996), Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988), 
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958), and 
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), but there are many, many more, and some scholars 
will undoubtedly disagree with my estimate of their relative fame. 
 24. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 69-70 ((referring both to the law of negligence (the extent of any 
duty that the defendant owed to the plaintiff) and to property law (whether the plaintiff was a 
trespasser or a licensee)). 
 25. Id. at 78 (emphasis added). 
 26. I have suggested elsewhere that viewing the applicability of state law as the default rule 
makes a good beginning point for accurate Erie analysis.  See Doernberg, supra note 11, at 645. 
 27. See, e.g., JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR C. MILLER, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE § 4.4, at 217 (4th ed. 2005) (“Taken together, the decision in Erie and the Court’s 
promulgation of the Federal Rules … indicate that a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction 
should apply the substantive law of the state in which it was [sic] located, and the procedural law 
prescribed in the Federal Rules.”).  
 28. See, e.g., Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988) (applying a federal common 
law rule of military contractors’ immunity to a Virginia tort action); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. 
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (applying the federal common law act-of-state doctrine in a 
5
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Since the Court decided Erie in 1938, it has approached the vertical 
choice-of-law problem in different ways.  Guaranty Trust Co. v. York29 
declared that a rule of law was substantive for Erie purposes if choosing 
federal versus state law would be outcome determinative.  State statute-
of-limitations periods became substantive.30  The outcome-determinative 
approach caused difficulties because of its rigidity, but another statement 
also created problems.  Justice Frankfurter declared, “a federal court 
adjudicating a state-created right solely because of the diversity of 
citizenship of the parties is for that purpose, in effect, only another court 
of the State. . . .”31  In his view, a diversity case should always reach the 
same result that the state courts would reach.  The trouble with that 
statement is that too many courts, including the Supreme Court, took it 
literally.    With all respect to a great Justice, the impact of that statement 
is wildly overbroad, because it makes the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure wholly inapplicable in diversity cases except where they 
differ in no respect from state procedural law.  If a federal court in 
diversity is really no more than another court of the state, then a fortiori 
it cannot deviate from state procedure.  The authorization and continued 
existence of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure demonstrate the 
limitations of such reasoning. 
For 145 years, from the beginning of the Republic to 1934, 
Congress had directed the federal courts to use state procedure, first in 
the Process Act, a part of the Judiciary Law of 178932 and then, when 
the static conformity that statute decreed33 became unworkable, in the 
Conformity Act of 1872,34 which replaced static conformity with 
dynamic conformity.  In 1934, however, more than a decade before 
 
diversity case sounding in contract).  In both cases, using the federal rule rather than the state rule 
reversed what would otherwise have been the outcome. 
 29. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).  Under the Guaranty Trust approach, both Sabbatino and Boyle 
would have come out the other way. 
 30. Sometimes, just to add to the confusion, statutes of limitation can be both substantive and 
procedural in the same case.  In a post-Guaranty-Trust fact pattern similar to Erie (a tort action 
arising outside the forum but tried in a federal court in the forum), the federal court would apply the 
limitations law that the forum state would apply, see Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 
487 (1941), because under Guaranty Trust, limitations are substantive for Erie purposes.  The state, 
on the other hand, would likely use its own limitations period for the reason that, as a general rule in 
the law of horizontal (state-state) conflicts, statutes of limitation are procedural.  See, e.g., Wells v. 
Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 517 (1953).  See infra notes 103, 153 (discussing Bournias v. 
Atl. Mar. Co., 220 F.2d 152, 154-56 (2d Cir. 1955)). 
 31. Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 108. 
 32. Act of September 29, 1789, ch. 21, 1 Stat. 93. 
 33. See id. at 93-94 (directing the federal courts to use procedure approved by the state 
supreme courts as of the date of passage of the Process Act). 
 34. Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196. 
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Guaranty Trust, Congress finally authorized the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  The authorization came at the end of what scholars have 
characterized as a decades-long battle.35  Congress’s motives were 
apparently to substitute horizontal procedural uniformity among the 
federal district courts for the long-standing vertical uniformity with the 
procedural law of the state in which a particular federal court happened 
to sit.  At the same time, Congress wanted to keep the federal courts 
away from the substantive law-making that the Constitution allocates to 
Congress.36  The Rules Enabling Act37 explicitly permitted the Supreme 
Court to unite law and equity procedure,38 and procedural rules generally 
applicable in the federal courts would necessarily produce horizontal 
uniformity.  The “only” two limitations REA imposed were that 
procedural rules under its ægis could “neither abridge, enlarge nor 
modify the substantive rights of any litigant,”39 and that the unification 
of the rules of law and equity could not narrow the common law right to 
a jury trial in civil cases.  The first of those limitations, however, gave 
rise to significant interpretive problems that threatened the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure’s effectiveness in diversity cases.  The challenge first 
appeared in the Supreme Court in Sibbach & Co. v. Wilson,40 but it was 
 
 35. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 
1023-24 (1982) (referring to a twenty-year battle); Steven N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered 
Common Law:  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 
909, 909 (1987) (“After almost twenty-five years of battle, Congress passed the Enabling Act of 
1934. . . .”). 
  Erie and the Rules Enabling Act have spawned considerable academic literature, far too 
extensive for complete citation.  See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Dennis Murashko, The Rules 
Enabling Act and the Procedural-Substantive Tension:  A Lesson in Statutory Interpretation, 93 
MINN. L. REV. 26 (2008); Paul D. Carrington, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling 
Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 281; Burbank, supra; Subrin, supra; Ely, supra note 9. 
 36. See, e.g., Redish & Murashko, supra note 35, at 32 (“To a reasonable bystander observing 
the passage of the Enabling Act, two underlying purposes should have been readily apparent:  (1) 
creating a uniform and effective system of procedural rules for the federal courts, while (2) 
preserving the substantive lawmaking power for Congress, free from challenge or threat from the 
Supreme Court’s newly created rulemaking authority.” (footnotes omitted)).  See also Carrington, 
supra note 35, at 283 (“The concern expressed in Congress was that an expansive reading might be 
given to the statutory term “procedure” to enable a court rule to override political decisions made by 
Congress.”). 
 37. Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2072 (2006)) (hereinafter “REA”). 
 38. Id. § 2. 
 39. Id. § 1.  In 1948, Congress amended the statute to read “any substantive right.”  See Act of 
June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 961.  Professor Burbank noted that the change appears to have been 
one of “phraseology” only.  Burbank, supra note 35, at 1103. 
 40. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).  See infra notes 89-94, 223-30 and accompanying text. 
7
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Guaranty Trust’s outcome-determinative test that ultimately created the 
greatest danger. 
A trio of 1949 cases41 using Guaranty Trust’s approach 
underscored the vulnerability of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  In 
each case, the Court disdained applying the Federal Rule because the 
choice of federal or state law was outcome-determinative.  Guaranty 
Trust’s test ultimately created what Professor Ely described as an 
inevitable backlash.42  In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Electrical Cooperative, 
Inc.,43 the Court introduced a new approach—interest balancing44—
under which outcome-determinativeness became only one of three 
factors the federal courts would consider in making the vertical choice-
of-law decision.  The other two were the state’s interest in the 
application of its rule and the federal government’s interest (presuming 
the existence of constitutional authority) in federal law governing the 
issue.45 
Hanna v. Plumer46 carved out a special niche for the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, holding that a Rule on point and in direct collision 
with a competing state rule, if within the authorization of the Rules 
Enabling Act, would govern.  Hanna was simply a special case of 
supremacy, under which “[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land. . . .”47  No one has ever seriously questioned 
Congress’s power to have passed REA,48 so the applicability of a 
Federal Rule today depends only on the scope of its words and whether 
 
 41. Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949) (holding that the 
state rule that the statute of limitations stops running at service applied over Federal Rule 3, which 
specified that filing the complaint commenced the action); Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan 
Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (holding that the state requirement of plaintiff posting bond in a 
shareholder’s derivative action applied despite then-Rule 23 (now Rule 23.1) having no bond 
requirement); Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949) (holding that the state law 
denying unregistered out-of-state corporation access to state courts as a plaintiff applied over 
Federal Rule 17’s statement that the law of the state of incorporation determined capacity to sue).  I 
shall refer to them collectively as “the 1949 trio.”  See infra notes 235-54 and accompanying text. 
 42. Ely, supra note 9, at 709. 
 43. 356 U.S. 525 (1958). 
 44. See Ely, supra note 9, at 709 (noting that the Byrd Court could have rested the decision on 
the Seventh Amendment directly but chose the balancing approach instead). 
 45. See FRIEDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER, supra note 27, § 4.3, at 213.  See generally 
Doernberg, supra note 11, at 633-35. 
 46. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
 47. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
 48. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Sibbach & Co. v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1 
(1941). 
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it “abridge[s], enlarge[s] or modif[ies] any substantive right.”49  That 
limitation on the Federal Rules has been in place since REA’s original 
iteration in 1934.50  Unfortunately, Hanna was not very clear about the 
test that should apply under REA to determine what was substantive.  At 
one point, the Court echoed Sibbach’s really-regulates-procedure 
language,51 but later in the opinion it borrowed from Mississippi 
Publishing Corp. v. Murphree52 by referring to whether a Federal Rule’s 
effect on substantive rights was “incidental.”53  Neither gives the 
judiciary or the bar much guidance.54  Nonetheless, Hanna’s 
contribution—quite a substantial one—to the area of vertical choice-of-
law lies in its recognition that REA prescribes the only appropriate test 
for evaluating the legitimacy of a Federal Rule.55  The RDA cases from 
Erie forward play no direct role.56  
All of the Court’s vertical choice-of-law jurisprudence57 since Byrd 
has been nothing more than (sometimes regrettably well disguised) 
interest balancing, and that includes Hanna.58  With respect to enacted 
federal law—the Constitution, statutes, administrative regulations and 
the Federal Rules—the Supremacy Clause operates as the dispositive 
weight in the balance, mandating the triumph of federal law (even a 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure) over any contrary state rule.  
Nonetheless, that principle leaves the thorny question of when the 
Constitution and statutes (particularly REA) authorize the existence of 
 
 49. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006). 
 50. See supra note 39.  
 51. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464. 
 52. 326 U.S. 438 (1946).  
 53. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 465. 
 54. I say this notwithstanding Justice Scalia’s observation that “we have managed to muddle 
through well enough in the 69 years since Sibbach was decided,” apparently accepting that test as 
workable.  Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1447 
(2010).  Perhaps we have, but one always hopes for an approach that leaves less muddle rather than 
more.   
 55. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 469-71. 
 56. One should note, however, that after explaining that the Erie line of cases (referring 
particularly to Erie and Guaranty Trust) did not govern the validity of a Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure, the Court went on to explain that its approach would be unlikely to engender the forum-
shopping and inequitable administration of the law to which Erie had addressed itself.  Id. at 468-
69. 
 57. The modern understanding of the “Erie doctrine” today, despite Professor Ely’s objection, 
see supra note 9, is that it embraces all vertical choice-of-law decisions, including those falling 
under REA.  See Doernberg, supra note 11, at 612 n.2.  This Article follows that convention. 
 58. See Doernberg, supra note 11, at 612.  REA’s limiting language describes what may go 
into the balance and on which side—for or against the primacy of a Federal Rule—it weighs.  
Hanna recognized that, hence its conclusion that REA, not RDA, specifies the correct balance to 
use when considering a Federal Rule. 
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federal law in the first place.  That is the thicket into which the Shady 
Grove Court again ventured. 
This Article discusses the effect Shady Grove is likely to have on 
vertical choice-of-law in cases involving a Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure.  The Court splintered in Shady Grove. A five-to-four vote 
decided the case, and Justice Scalia’s opinion represented the Court only 
in Parts I and II-A.  The majority’s position was that Federal Rule 23 
and the state rule did directly clash with each other, but at that point, the 
majority split.  Four Justices took the position that Rule 23 did conflict 
directly with state law but did not address itself to substantive rights59 
and therefore was valid under REA.  Justice Stevens agreed that Rule 23 
was valid, but reached that position by determining that the competing 
state rule did not address substantive rights, writing separately to 
elaborate his inability to join the plurality’s analysis.60  Justice Ginsburg, 
joined by Justices Kennedy, Breyer and Alito, dissented.  Her view was 
that the Court should have read Rule 23 not to conflict with the state 
rule, clearing the path for application of the state rule in the diversity 
action.  She felt strongly that the state rule did address substantive rights.   
Part II of the Article discusses the majority opinion.  Part III deals 
with parts II-B and II-C of Justice Scalia’s opinion and with the con-
currence.61  Part IV addresses the dissent.  Part V offers a critical 
evaluation of the opinions.  Part VI discusses some of the scholarly 
interpretations of REA and suggests two possible perspectives on REA’s 
substantive-rights limitation that make it more understandable in light of 
the Erie doctrine’s history, easier to navigate, and less of a threat to pre-
dictability in future cases.  The first perspective considers using the 
elements of a claim and of defenses on the merits as the touchstone.62  It 
has an intra-litigation focus.  I reject that alternative because it omits a 
group of cases, albeit a small one, that suggest that a somewhat less 
mechanical approach would be more faithful to the balance of rule-
 
 59. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Sotomayor joined Parts II-B and II-D of 
Justice Scalia’s opinion. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436 (Scalia, J., for himself, the Chief Justice 
and Justices Thomas and Sotomayor). 
 60. Only the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas joined part II-C, which was a reply to the 
concurrence.  Id. (Scalia, J., for himself, the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas). 
 61. Part II-D of Justice Scalia’s opinion, joined by Justices Scalia, Roberts, Thomas and 
Sotomayor, merely acknowledged that Shady Grove’s decision in favor of Rule 23 would engender 
forum-shopping.  Id. (Scalia, J., for himself, the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas and Sotomayor).  
Justice Scalia explained that while judicial decisions creating a rule that would produce forum-
shopping were at least highly suspect, such a consequence was “the inevitable (indeed, one might 
say the intended) result of a uniform system of federal procedure.”  Id. at 1449. 
 62. See infra note 221 and accompanying text. 
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making power between Congress and the Court at which REA aims.63  
The second perspective seizes upon an approach that Justice Harlan first 
articulated in Hanna v. Plumer,64 expands upon it, and casts the Court’s 
previous efforts to deal with REA in a more understandable light.65  That 
perspective is an extra-litigation focus.  Unfortunately, the Shady Grove 
Court missed an opportunity to clarify and rationalize its approach to 
REA. 
II.  THE MAJORITY OPINION 
The facts of Shady Grove are quite simple.  New York law66 
mandates that properly documented claims for insurance benefits 
relating to automobile accidents are payable within thirty days.  It 
imposes a statutory penalty of two percent per month, plus reasonable 
attorney’s fees, for late payments.  Shady Grove, assignee of benefits 
owed by Allstate to one of its insureds, brought a diversity action and 
sought under Rule 2367 to have the court certify a class of all insureds to 
whom Allstate owed interest.  Shady Grove alleged that Allstate 
routinely refused to pay interest.  The district court dismissed the action 
for lack of jurisdiction.68  It relied on the diversity statute,69 finding that 
Shady Grove’s individual claim70 did not meet the minimum 
jurisdictional amount of 28 U.S.C. § 1332.71  The court rejected Shady 
 
 63. Many scholars have argued that REA’s limiting language addresses that separation-of-
powers issue, not the federalism issue that has tended to dominate legal thinking since the Court 
announced Erie.  See infra notes 190-192, 315-320 and accompanying text. 
 64. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
 65. See infra text following note 195. 
 66. N.Y. INSURANCE LAW § 5106 (McKinney 2009) (“(a) Payments of first party benefits and 
additional first party benefits shall be made as the loss is incurred.  Such benefits are overdue if not 
paid within thirty days after the claimant supplies proof of the fact and amount of loss sustained.  If 
proof is not supplied as to the entire claim, the amount which is supported by proof is overdue if not 
paid within thirty days after such proof is supplied.  All overdue payments shall bear interest at the 
rate of two percent per month.  If a valid claim or portion was overdue, the claimant shall also be 
entitled to recover his attorney's reasonable fee, for services necessarily performed in connection 
with securing payment of the overdue claim, subject to limitations promulgated by the 
superintendent in regulations.”). 
 67. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 68. Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 466 F. Supp. 2d 467 
(E.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 549 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010). 
 69. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006). 
 70. Justice Scalia’s opinion notes that Shady Grove’s claim amounted to approximately $500.  
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437.  Justice Ginsburg agreed.  Id. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 71. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006). 
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Grove’s argument that § 1332(d)(2)72 applied, on the ground that the 
statutory-mandated interest was a penalty within the meaning of New 
York’s statute governing class actions,73 which prohibits class actions in 
penalty cases unless specifically authorized by the statute creating the 
penalty.74  The Second Circuit affirmed, seeing no direct conflict 
between Rule 23 and section 901(b) and finding the prohibition 
“substantive” for Erie purposes.75 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion took issue with the Second 
Circuit’s finding that there was no direct conflict between Rule 23 and 
section 901(b).76  Both address the single issue of when it is proper to 
certify a class.77  In the Supreme Court’s view, Rule 23 allows 
certification whenever the action meets the four requisites of Rule 23(a) 
and fits under one of the categories of Rule 23(b).  New York’s class 
action statute echoes the four requisites of Rule 23(a) and adds con-
sideration (modeled on Rule 23(b)(3)) of whether a class action is a 
 
 72. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2006). That section grants jurisdiction to the district courts for 
class actions in which there is minimal diversity and the matter in controversy exceeds $5,000,000, 
irrespective of the size of the class representative’s individual claim. Id. 
 73. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901 (McKinney 2006). 
 74. Id. § 901(b) (“Unless a statute creating or imposing a penalty, [sic] or a minimum measure 
of recovery specifically authorizes the recovery thereof in a class action, an action to recover a 
penalty, [sic] or minimum measure of recovery created or imposed by statute may not be maintained 
as a class action.”). 
 75. Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 549 F.3d 137, 145-146 (2d 
Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).  The Second Circuit stated: 
Thus, the purpose behind CPLR 901(b) is to offset the deterrent effect of statutory 
penalties by eliminating the class action device as a means of enforcement of those 
penalties.  CPLR 901(b) should be interpreted as part of the statutory interest penalty 
scheme, because it serves the state interest of offsetting that penalty.  Allowing plaintiff 
to pursue its claims in federal court as a class action would circumvent this state policy. 
Id. at 549 F.3d at 145-46.  It is curious that the New York legislature would simultaneously 
create a statutory penalty and seek to offset its deterrent effect.  On the other hand, one should never 
underestimate the New York legislature’s capacity for folly, so the fact that the legislature did an 
incomplete (even self-contradictory) job should not surprise anyone.  But, as the Court has 
admonished, courts sit to interpret and judge the constitutionality of legislation, not its wisdom.  
See, e.g., Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 333 (1981) (“[T]he District Court essentially acted as a 
superlegislature, passing on the wisdom of congressional policy determinations.  In so doing, the 
court exceeded its proper role.” (citations omitted)); Ferguson v. Skrupka, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) 
(“We refuse to sit as a superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation. . . .”). 
 76. Both Justice Ginsburg’s dissent and the Second Circuit pointed out that every district 
court to have considered the question agreed that there was no unavoidable conflict between Rule 
23 and section 901(b).  See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1465 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Shady 
Grove, 549 F.3d at 143.  See infra text accompanying notes 128-34. 
 77. Justice Scalia noted and rejected the Second Circuit’s attempt to distinguish between a 
disputes “eligibility” for class action treatment and a dispute about whether it is proper to certify a 
class.   Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1438.  “To begin with, the line between eligibility and 
certifiability is entirely artificial.  Both are preconditions for maintaining a class action.”  Id. 
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superior method of resolution of the dispute.  But New York’s statute 
then imposes an additional limitation not found in Rule 23:  
disqualification of penalty class actions.  The Court saw New York’s 
rule as impermissibly attempting to modify Rule 23.78 
Having assembled a majority for that point of view, Justice Scalia 
next had to address the REA problem:  whether Rule 23, unavoidably in 
conflict with the state rule, runs afoul of REA’s substantive-right 
prohibition.  He concluded that it does not because Rule 23 is not 
substantive, but that part of his opinion drew the support of only three 
other Justices.  Justice Stevens concurred that there was no REA 
violation but reached that conclusion by finding that section 901(b) was 
not substantive, adding the fifth vote for the result in Shady Grove. 
III.  THE MAJORITY JUSTICES’ REA ANALYSES 
A. Part II-B of Justice Scalia’s Opinion 
Justice Scalia recited the history of the Court’s approach to REA 
questions.  He quoted Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.’s statement “that the 
Rule must ‘really regulat[e] procedure,—the judicial process for 
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly 
administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.’”79  
The Sibbach formulation, as others have pointed out,80 begs the question 
of what is procedure and what is substance.  The Court recognized that 
difficulty and elaborated Sibbach’s meaning in Mississippi Publishing 
Corp. v. Murphree,81 using language upon which Justice Scalia relied.  
He observed that, 
 
 78. In this respect, Shady Grove closely resembles Byrd v. Blue Ridge, 356 U.S. 525 (1958), 
in which a South Carolina statute forbade a jury trial in workers compensation cases whereas FED. 
R. CIV. P. 38 permitted them.  The Byrd Court effectively told the states that they could control “the 
definition of state-created rights and obligations by the state courts.”  356 U.S. at 535.  Justice 
Brennan made clear, however, that he was speaking of non-litigation rights and obligations—in 
short, the kinds of things that we colloquially think of as substantive rather than procedural.  Id. at 
537-38.  He denied South Carolina the power to control the federal courts’ processing of litigation.  
Id. at 538-39. 
 79. Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1444 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941) 
(citations omitted)). 
 80. See, e.g., In re Richards, 213 F.3d 773, 791 (3d Cir. 2002) (characterizing the Sibbach test 
as “of little help”); William M. Wiecek, The Debut of Modern Constitutional Procedure, 26 REV. 
LITIG. 641, 677 (2007); David Crump, The Twilight Zone of the Erie Doctrine:  Is there Really a 
Different Choice of Equitable Remedies in the “Court a Block Away”?, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1233, 
1237. 
 81. 326 U.S. 438 (1946). 
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The test is not whether the rule affects a litigant’s substantive rights; 
most procedural rules do.  What matters is what the rule itself 
regulates:  If it governs only “the manner and the means” by which the 
litigants’ rights are “enforced,” it is valid; if it alters “the rules of 
decision by which [the] court will adjudicate [those] rights,” it is not.82 
This is not surprising.  The Court’s recognition of the substantive 
effects of procedural rules and the impact of the outcome-determinative 
test on the Federal Rules in the 1949 trio83 caused it to abandon 
exclusive reliance on that test in favor of Byrd’s interest-balancing 
approach.  That approach has dominated Erie jurisprudence for the past 
half century.84  Using Murphree’s approach, Justice Scalia concluded 
that Rule 23 was a method for adjudicating claims, much as Federal 
Rules 18,85 20,86 and 42(a)87 are, rather than alteration of substantive 
rights and liabilities.88 
The Shady Grove problem resembles problems the Court has faced 
before:  what to do when federal procedural rules provide a procedure 
that state law either does not authorize or affirmatively prohibits.  
Sibbach v. Wilson Co.89 is the best known example.  Illinois law forbade 
compulsory physical examinations in damage actions.90  Rule 35 
allowed them.  The Court affirmed the district court’s order that the 
plaintiff undergo a physical examination.  Justice Owen Roberts, writing 
for the Sibbach majority, found that Rule 35 “really regulates 
procedure”91 and identified the flaw in the plaintiff’s argument: 
[P]etitioner admits, and, we think, correctly, that Rules 35 and 37 are 
rules of procedure.  She insists, nevertheless, that by the prohibition 
against abridging substantive rights, Congress has banned the rules 
here challenged.  In order to reach this result she translates 
 
 82. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442 (quoting Murphree, 326 U.S. at 446). 
 83. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 84. See infra notes 290-92 and accompanying text.  See generally Doernberg, supra note 11. 
 85. FED. R. CIV. P. 18 (joinder of claims).  See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1443. 
 86. FED. R. CIV. P. 20 (joinder of parties).  See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1443. 
 87. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a) (consolidation of actions).  See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1443.  He 
might as well have included FED. R. CIV. P. 13 (counterclaims and crossclaims), FED. R. CIV. P. 14 
(impleader), FED. R. CIV. P. 19 (parties needed for a just adjudication), FED. R. CIV. P. 22 
(interpleader), FED. R. CIV. P. 24 (intervention) and FED. R. CIV. P. 25 (substitution of parties).  
FED. R. CIV. P. 14 is particularly relevant in this context.  See infra notes 95-99 and accompanying 
text. 
 88. Discussion of Allstate’s contrary argument appears in Justice Scalia’s opinion.  See Shady 
Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1438-39. 
 89. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).   
 90. See id. at 7. 
 91. Id. at 14. 
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“substantive” into “important” or “substantial” rights.  And she urges 
that if a rule affects such a right, albeit the rule is one of procedure 
merely, its prescription is not within the statutory grant of power 
embodied in the Act of June 19, 1934.92 
Thus Sibbach refused the plaintiff’s re-characterization of REA’s 
prohibition, though unfortunately it did little to provide a workable 
standard.  It approved sanctions under Rule 37 for plaintiff’s refusal to 
comply with the Rule 35 order.93  Thus, where state law recognized a 
right incompatible with a Federal Rule (and, obviously would not have 
permitted sanctions for an order no state court had authority to issue), 
the Supreme Court held that the Federal Rule governed.  Rule 35 
overcame the contrary state law because the latter did not speak to the 
question of the defendant’s liability for the plaintiff’s personal injuries.94  
Only Justice Frankfurter dissented. 
In Jeub v. B/G Foods, Inc.,95 the third-party plaintiff had no ripe 
claim against the third-party defendant for indemnity under state law.96  
The court nonetheless permitted the impleader.  The court noted that 
“invoking of the third-party procedural practice must not do violence to 
the substantive rights of the parties . . . ,”97 an obvious reference to REA.  
But the court held that Rule 14 had no substantive effect, instead 
concerning itself only with the timing of the assertion of the state-
created substantive right.  It relied on Rule 14’s language allowing 
impleader of a party “‘who is or may be liable. . . .’”98  Courts since 
Jeub have cited it with some regularity and never with disapproval.99 
Justice Scalia’s opinion cited Sibbach but did not discuss it at 
length.  He relied on it for the idea that REA does not prohibit a Federal 
Rule from having any effect on any substantive right.  Justice Scalia did 
 
 92. Id. at 11. 
 93. However, it disallowed the sanction of contempt that the lower court had imposed, noting 
that Rule 37 explicitly excluded that particular sanction for refusal to comply with an order to have 
a physical examination.  Id. at 16. 
 94. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 108 F.2d 415, 415 (7th Cir. 1939), rev’d, 312 U.S. 1 (1941).   
 95. 2 F.R.D. 238 (D. Minn. 1942). 
 96. State law only gave rise to a claim for contribution or indemnity after “the party . . . 
suffered some loss or paid more than his share of the loss. . . .”  Id. at 240.  Under Minnesota law, 
therefore, a defendant against whom there was not yet any judgment had no substantive right to 
recover from a third-party defendant under state law. 
 97. Id. 
 98.  Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 14) (emphasis by the court). 
 99. See, e.g., Riblet Tramway Co., Inc. v. Marathon Elec. Avtek Drive Div., 621 A.2d 1274 
(Vt. 1993); Colton v. Swain, 527 F.2d 296 (7th Cir. 1975); Kittleson v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 81 
F. Supp. 25 (D. Iowa 1948); Anderson v. Kenosha Auto Transp., 6 F.R.D. 265 (D. Minn. 1946). 
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not discuss other cases100 illustrating that principle, including Jeub.  It is 
not clear why he did not, especially because these precedents appear to 
support his approach, and his opinion might have been stronger had he 
relied on them. 
B. Part II-C of Justice Scalia’s Opinion and Justice Stevens’s 
Concurrence 
Part II-C of Justice Scalia’s opinion, supported only by the Chief 
Justice and Justice Thomas,101 responded to Justice Stevens’s 
concurrence, which declined to join Parts II-B, II-C and II-D of Justice 
Scalia’s opinion.  Rather than beginning with Rule 23, Justice Stevens 
approached the REA problem differently.  He focused on whether the 
state rule—section 901(b)—was substantive or procedural, arguing that 
it was procedural because it did not “function as a part of the State’s 
definition of substantive rights and remedies.”102  To him, the fact that 
section 901(b) did not define Allstate’s liability for untimely payments 
made the rule procedural only.103 
 
 100. See, e.g., Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 125 n.22 
(1968) (holding Rule 19 governed with respect to non-parties) (“[I]n a diversity case the question of 
joinder is one of federal law.”); Olden v. Hagerstown Cash Register, Inc., 619 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 
1980) (holding Rule 24 controlled time and manner of intervention, though state law controlled 
whether intervenor had a judicially cognizable interest); Har-Pen Truck Lines, Inc. v. Mills, 378 
F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1967) (holding Rule 18 applied despite state statute that forbade joinder of 
contract and tort claims); D’Onofrio Const. Co. v. Recon Co., 255 F.2d 904 (1st Cir. 1958) (holding 
Rule 14 applied despite that absence of state impleader); Siebrand v. Gossnell, 234 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 
1956) (holding Rule 20, not contrary Arizona law, governed permissibility of joinder of parties-
defendant who were severally, not jointly, liable as tortfeasors); Counsel Financial Services, LLC v. 
Melkersen Law, P.C., 602 F. Supp.2d 448 (W.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding Rule 13 permitted 
counterclaim despite explicit New York statute disallowing counterclaims in the circumstances). 
 101. Justice Sotomayor did not join and did not explain why she did not join.  Perhaps she 
refrained because she viewed Part II-C as dictum. 
 102. Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1448 
(2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  Thus, he recalled some of 
the language of Byrd.  See supra note 78. 
 103. He did acknowledge that some state procedural rules may define substantive rights, Shady 
Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1450 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  Justice 
Stevens also asserted that if a state procedural rule “‘defines the dimensions’ of a state-created 
claim,” “there would be an Enabling Act problem, and the federal rule would have to give way.”  Id. 
at 1456.  He agreed in theory with Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, 130 S. Ct. at 1461-64 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting), but disagreed with her assertion that Shady Grove was such a case.  For Justice 
Ginsburg, this phenomenon was a rallying point for her argument that the Court should have read 
Rule 23 with greater sensitivity for New York’s substantive interests, referring to the Court’s 
“relentless[ ]” reading of Rule 23).  Id. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
  Precedent supports the idea that some rules that look procedural are actually substantive, 
but it is important to note how limited it is.  In Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Co., 220 F.2d 152, 
154-56 (2d Cir. 1955), then-Judge Harlan explained when federal courts would regard a non-federal 
16
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To Justice Scalia, Justice Stevens focused on the wrong question.  
Justice Scalia read REA and Sibbach to mandate inquiry not into 
whether the state law is substantive, but instead whether the federal law 
is.  “The concurrence contends that Sibbach did not rule out its ap-
proach, but that is not so.  Recognizing the impracticability of a test that 
turns on  the idiosyncrasies of state law, Sibbach adopted and applied a 
rule with a single criterion:  whether the Federal Rule ‘really regulates 
procedure.’ ”104  He accused Justice Stevens of wanting effectively to 
overrule Sibbach rather than to apply it,105 but rejected the invitation:  
“Sibbach has been settled law . . . for nearly seven decades.”106 
Justice Stevens argued that Justice Scalia’s reading of REA was 
unfaithful to the statute’s purpose, because some rules that look 
procedural may have substantive purposes.107  Justice Scalia 
 
limitation period as substantive, requiring its application in the federal courts.  The case did not 
implicate Guaranty Trust because it was an admiralty case in which a seaman had two libel claims 
against respondent’s vessel and thus did not arise under state law.  Id. at 153.  The matter in dispute 
was whether to apply an Article of the Panamanian labor code that barred claims filed more than 
one year after accrual.  Id. at 154.  That required the court to decide whether the limitation was 
substantive or procedural for choice-of-law purposes.  Id. at 154-55.  Judge Harlan focused on five 
factors that the courts should consider, which he discussed at some length.  See id.  For present 
purposes, the factors themselves are irrelevant.  It is relevant, however, that the court recognized 
that there were circumstances in which rules of law that one normally thinks of as procedural are 
actually substantive.  See also Carrington, supra note 35 at 290. 
  Justice Ginsburg’s Shady Grove dissent offered other examples.  Note, however, that the 
dissent’s examples, see Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1471 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) all antedate 
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), which adopted the current approach to the vertical choice-
of-law inquiry with respect to the Federal Rules.  The Court decided two of the cases (part of the 
1949 trio) under Guaranty Trust’s outcome-determinative test, which Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. 
Cooperative, 356 U.S. 525 (1958), modified.  The third, Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943), 
stated that “[t]he question of the burden of establishing contributory negligence is a question of 
local law which federal courts in diversity of citizenship cases must apply.”  Id. at 117 (citation 
omitted).  Palmer is not apposite to Shady Grove, because there was no Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure that governed who had the burden of proof.  The Palmer Court declined to read Rule 
8(c), which made contributory negligence an affirmative defense for pleading purposes, also to 
declare sub silentio which party had the burden of proof.  Palmer would undoubtedly come out the 
same way under Hanna, because there is no direct collision.  The Shady Grove Court, on the other 
hand, found Rule 23 and section 901(b) squarely in opposition.  See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 
1438.  See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text. 
 104. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1445 (Scalia, J., for himself, the Chief Justice and Justice 
Thomas) (citing Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14).  Justice Scalia also rebutted another part of Justice 
Stevens’s argument:  “That the concurrence’s approach would have yielded the same result in 
Sibbach proves nothing; what matters is the rule we did apply, and that rule leaves no room for 
special exemptions based on the function or purpose of a particular state rule.”  Id. (footnote 
omitted). 
 105. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 106. Id. at 1446 (footnote omitted). 
 107. Id. at 1449 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“It is 
important to observe that the balance Congress has struck turns, in part, on the nature of the state 
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acknowledged Justice Stevens’s point108 but continued to insist that 
Justice Stevens had failed to interpret REA properly: 
The concurrence’s approach, however, is itself unfaithful to the 
statute's terms. Section 2072(b) bans abridgement [sic] or modification 
only of “substantive rights,” but the concurrence would prohibit pre-
emption of “procedural rules that are intimately bound up in the scope 
of a substantive right or remedy. . . .”  This would allow States to force 
a wide array of parochial procedures on federal courts so long as they 
are “sufficiently intertwined with a state right or remedy.” 109 
Thus, the battle lines between the two Justices were drawn—and no 
one prevailed.  Justices Scalia and Stevens were at odds about what REA 
and Sibbach mandate.  It will be interesting to see what position Justice 
Kagan, Justice Stevens’s successor, takes.  Justice Stevens ended up 
concurring in the judgment but reached that conclusion by a different 
path from Justice Scalia.  Justice Ginsburg and her three joining 
colleagues were unable to get there at all, and her opinion requires 
careful attention. 
IV.  THE DISSENT 
Justice Ginsburg had a different starting point.  It was self-evident 
to her that section 901(b)’s prohibition was a substantive right belonging 
to and enforceable by the defendant. 
The Court today approves Shady Grove’s attempt to transform a $500 
case into a $5,000,000 award, although the State creating the right to 
recover has proscribed this alchemy.  If Shady Grove had filed suit in 
New York state court, the 2% interest payment authorized . . . as a 
penalty for overdue benefits would, by Shady Grove's own measure, 
 
law that is being displaced by a federal rule.  And in my view, the application of that balance does 
not necessarily turn on whether the state law at issue takes the form of what is traditionally 
described as substantive or procedural.  Rather, it turns on whether the state law actually is part of a 
State’s framework of substantive rights or remedies.”). 
 108. Id. at 1445-46 (Scalia, J., for himself, the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas) (“There is 
something to that.  It is possible to understand how it can be determined whether a Federal Rule 
‘enlarges’ substantive rights without consulting State law:  If the Rule creates a substantive right, 
even one that duplicates some state-created rights, it establishes a new federal right.  But it is hard to 
understand how it can be determined whether a Federal Rule ‘abridges’ or ‘modifies’ substantive 
rights without knowing what state-created rights would obtain if the Federal Rule did not exist.  
Sibbach’s exclusive focus on the challenged Federal Rule—driven by the very real concern that 
Federal Rules which vary from State to State would be chaos . . . —is hard to square with 
§ 2072(b)’s terms.”). 
 109. Id. at 1446 n.11 (quoting id. at 1458, 1455 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment)). 
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amount to no more than $500.  By instead filing in federal court based 
on the parties’ diverse citizenship and requesting class certification, 
Shady Grove hopes to recover, for the class, statutory damages of more 
than $5,000,000.  The New York Legislature has barred this remedy 
 . . . .110 
Having thus conceptualized the New York legislative scheme, it 
was a straightforward matter for Justice Ginsburg and her colleagues to 
find that the Court’s interpretations of Rule 23 and REA were improper. 
Relying significantly on two cases from the 1949 trio111—decided 
under Guaranty Trust’s outcome-determinative approach rather than 
Hanna’s REA approach—Justice Ginsburg argued that the Shady Grove 
Court should have interpreted Rule 23 to avoid the clash with 
section 901(b)’s prohibition.112  She also relied on Walker v. Armco 
Steel Co.,113 a post-Hanna decision that reached Ragan’s result but 
abandoned its theory.114  Ragan directed applying the state rule because 
not applying it would have produced a different outcome (maintenance 
of the action versus dismissal for untimeliness).115  That was faithful to 
Guaranty Trust.  Walker, by contrast, read Rule 3’s language116 not to 
address the event that stops a state statute of limitations from running.  
In both Ragan and Walker, the state had specified service on the 
defendant as the critical event.117 
Justice Ginsburg reviewed her opinion for the Court in Gasperini v. 
Center for Humanities, Inc.118  She characterized Gasperini as having 
read Rule 59’s language119 narrowly to avoid conflict with a New York 
rule allowing judges to review jury verdicts “to determine whether they 
‘deviate[d] materially from what would be reasonable compensation 
 
 110. Id. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (referring to “New York’s 
restriction on the availability of statutory damages”).  Read quickly enough, the argument is 
appealing.  Closer analysis, however, suggests a different conclusion.  See infra notes 159-64, 332 
and accompanying text. 
 111. Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); Cohen v. 
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). 
 112. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 113. 446 U.S. 740 (1980). 
 114. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1461 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 115. Ragan, 337 U.S. at 533-34. 
 116. FED. R. CIV. P. 3 provides, “A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the 
court.” 
 117. Walker, 446 U.S. at 742; Ragan, 337 U.S. at 531. 
 118. 518 U.S. 415 (1996). 
 119. FED. R. CIV. P 59 provided in pertinent part that a district judge could grant a motion for a 
new trial “for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law 
in the courts of the United States.”  She noted that Rule 59’s most common use was to assess the 
excessiveness of damages.  Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 437 n.22. 
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. . . .’”120  That standard differed from the federal shocks-the-conscience 
test.121  Having already characterized section 901(b) as “New York’s 
limitation on statutory damages,”122 she accused the majority of giving it 
“no quarter.”123  Thus, she sought to bring Shady Grove in line with her 
majority result in Gasperini, in which the Court viewed New York’s 
reasonable-compensation standard as a statutory cap—albeit a flexible 
one—on damages.124 
Justice Ginsburg relied on the legislative history of the amendment 
of New York’s class action statute that included section 901(b).  That 
history suggested that organizations faced with possible class actions 
lobbied the legislature to avoid that result.  “These constituents ‘feared 
that recoveries beyond actual damages could lead to excessively harsh 
results.’ ”125  Justice Ginsburg also relied on the governor’s signing 
statement with respect to the revised class action statute,126 concluding:  
“[T]he final bill . . . was the result of a compromise among competing 
interests.” . . . Section 901(a) allows courts leeway in deciding whether 
to certify a class, but § 901(b) rejects the use of the class mechanism to 
pursue the particular remedy of statutory damages.  The limitation was 
not designed with the fair conduct or efficiency of litigation in mind.  
Indeed, suits seeking statutory damages are arguably best suited to the 
class device because individual proof of actual damages is 
unnecessary.  New York’s decision instead to block class-action 
proceedings for statutory damages therefore makes scant sense, except 
 
 120. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1463 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 
423-25 (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c) (McKinney 1995 & Supp. 2010))). 
 121. See id.  The Supreme Court has never articulated this test with respect to excessive or 
insufficient damages, but the lower federal courts have recognized it at least since the Federal Rules 
came into effect.  See, e.g., Lopoczyk v. Chester a Poling, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 839, 840 (S.D.N.Y.), 
aff’d, 152 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1945) (“It is familiar learning that the Court should not set aside a 
verdict on the ground that it is excessive unless it is so high as to shock the conscience.”); Zarek v. 
Fredericks, 138 F.2d 689, 691 (3d Cir. 1943) (jury award, although  “overliberal,” not “so 
outrageous” that appellate court could set it aside when trial court had not).   
To be sure, Gasperini did that, but that is far from all it said that is relevant to Shady Grove, as I will 
discuss later.  See infra notes 164-69 and accompanying text. 
 122. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1464 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 123. Id.   
 124. See infra notes 164-69 and accompanying text. 
 125. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1464 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (quoting Sperry v. Crompton 
Corp., 863 N.E.2d 1012, 1015 (N.Y. 2007)).  One should read this argument closely, however.  It is 
not really an argument against the class action device; it is an argument against the very existence of 
statutory penalties, hence the reference to “actual damages.” 
 126. Id. (“Governor Hugh Carey stated that the new statute ‘empowers the court to prevent 
abuse of the class action device and provides a controlled remedy.’” (emphasis added by Justice 
Ginsburg)).  Note, however, that neither the lobbyists, the legislature nor the signing statement 
questioned at all whether it was proper for the legislature to authorize statutory penalties. 
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as a means to a manifestly substantive end:  Limiting a defendant’s 
liability in a single lawsuit in order to prevent the exorbitant inflation 
of penalties—remedies the New York Legislature created with 
individual suits in mind.127 
Having made that argument, Justice Ginsburg then had to propose a 
reading of Rule 23 that avoided the difficulties the majority opinion 
presented. 
“The Court, I am convinced, finds conflict where none is 
necessary.”128  Noting that the Second Circuit, two of New York’s 
district courts, a Pennsylvania district court and the Connecticut 
Supreme Court had all concluded that for Erie purposes, section 901(b) 
was substantive and not in conflict with Rule 23,129 she explained her 
rationale: 
Rule 23 describes a method of enforcing a claim for relief, while 
§ 901(b) defines the dimensions of the claim itself.  In this regard, it is 
immaterial that § 901(b) bars statutory penalties in wholesale, rather 
than retail, fashion.  The New York Legislature could have embedded 
the limitation in every provision creating a cause of action for which a 
penalty is authorized; § 901(b) operates as shorthand to the same ef-
fect.130  
Thus, Justice Ginsburg sought to avoid a clash between state and 
federal law by reading section 901(b) as a substantive limitation on 
damages and Rule 23 only to facilitate efficient litigation.  “Section 
901(b) responds to an entirely different concern; it does not allow class 
members to recover statutory damages because the New York 
Legislature considered the result of adjudicating such claims en masse to 
be exorbitant.”131  Given that view, it is easy to understand why the 
 
 127. Id. at 1464-65 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (quoting Sperry, 863 N.E.2d at 
1015). 
 128. Id. at 1465. 
 129. See supra note 76. 
 130. Id. at 1466 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  The Court’s majority explicitly rejected the 
distinction.  See supra note 77.   
 131. Shady Grove, 131 S. Ct. at 1466 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).  In the 
omitted footnote, Justice Ginsburg responded to the deprecation of her reliance on the legislative 
history, ironically finding it to be both persuasive and unnecessary: 
The Court disputes the strength of the evidence of legislative intent . . . but offers no 
alternative account of § 901(b)’s purpose.  Perhaps this silence indicates how very hard it 
would be to ascribe to § 901(b) any purpose bound up with the fairness and efficiency of 
processing cases.  On its face, the proscription is concerned with remedies, i.e., the 
availability of statutory damages in a lawsuit.  Legislative history confirms this 
objective, but is not essential to revealing it. 
Id. at 1466 n.6.  She illustrated her point with a hypothetical example: 
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dissent did not see a direct collision with Rule 23.132  Justice Ginsburg 
rejected Shady Grove’s attempt to characterize the state rule as 
procedural, arguing instead that because it was an “outcome affec-
tive”133 statute, it had to apply “[w]hen no federal law or rule is 
dispositive of [the] issue.”134  She reiterated her argument that the New 
York rule functioned as a statutory cap on damages every bit as much as 
the cap that the Court honored in Gasperini.  She focused on Hanna’s 
evident concern that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure not become 
unnecessarily outcome-determinative:  “‘The Erie rule is rooted in part 
in a realization that it would be unfair for the character or result of a 
litigation materially to differ because the suit had been brought in a 
federal court.’”135  But Justice Ginsburg and her dissenting colleagues 
lost that battle. 
V.  EVALUATING THE OPINIONS 
A. Justice Scalia 
For Justice Scalia, REA analysis is straightforward.  There are only 
two questions for a court to answer.  The first is whether the Federal 
Rule directly addresses the issue.  In Shady Grove, the issue was whether 
 
Suppose, for example, that a State, wishing to cap damages in class actions at 
$1,000,000, enacted a statute providing that “a suit to recover more than $1,000,000 may 
not be maintained as a class action.”  Under the Court's reasoning—which attributes 
dispositive significance to the words “may not be maintained”—Rule 23 would preempt 
this provision, nevermind [sic] that Congress, by authorizing the promulgation of rules 
of procedure for federal courts, surely did not intend to displace state-created ceilings on 
damages.  
Id. at 1466. 
 132. One may question, however, whether Justice Ginsburg’s hypothetical example is truly 
apposite to the problem in Shady Grove.  See supra note 110 and accompanying text.   
 133. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1471 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 134. Id.   
 135. Id.  This appears to be an oblique reference to “the twin aims of the Erie rule:  
discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.”  
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).  I suggest the Court should have said, “the twin aim of 
Erie,” because the two parts of the formulation are only different sides of the same coin.  The 
forum-shopping Swift v. Tyson engendered is what caused the inequitable administration of the laws 
to which the Erie Court referred.   
  There is more to Justice Ginsburg’s use of this statement, however, than initially meets the 
eye.  Almost in the next breath, the Court’s opinion declared that the Erie approach is the wrong test 
for determining the legitimacy of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure:  “There is, however, a more 
fundamental flaw in respondent's syllogism:  the incorrect assumption that the rule of Erie R. Co. v. 
Tompkins constitutes the appropriate test of the validity and therefore the applicability of a Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure.”  Hanna, 380 U.S. 460, 469-70.  The Court prescribed REA as the proper 
test.  See id. at 470-74.   
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the case could proceed as a class action.136  The majority found that Rule 
23 applied by its terms, because it gives the district court permission to 
certify any class that meets the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b).137  
The majority rested largely on Rule 23’s lack of limitations relevant to 
Shady Grove and resisted what it saw as New York’s attempt to add an 
additional limitation to the Rule.138 
The Court refuted Allstate’s contrary argument by turning it back 
on itself.  Allstate urged that because Congress created some exceptions 
to Rule 23, the Rule was not categorical.139  The Court responded.  “The 
fact that Congress has created specific exceptions to Rule 23 hardly 
proves that the Rule does not apply generally. In fact, it proves the 
opposite.  If Rule 23 did not authorize class actions across the board, the 
statutory exceptions would be unnecessary.”140 
If the Federal Rule addresses the issue, the second question is 
whether it violates REA141 by abridging, enlarging or modifying a 
substantive right.  Justice Scalia discussed that issue in Part II-B.142  
There he and Justice Stevens diverged, leaving Justice Scalia one vote 
short of a majority for this part of his opinion.  He could not amass a 
majority for his discussions of whether Rule 23 has an impermissibly 
substantive effect because he and Justice Stevens disagreed about the 
correct question to ask.  Justice Scalia began by focusing on whether 
Rule 23 is substantive within the meaning of REA, concluding it is not 
because it “ ‘really regulates procedure.’ ”143  Essentially, he looked at 
 
 136. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437. 
 137. Id.  (“The question in dispute is whether Shady Grove's suit may proceed as a class action. 
Rule 23 provides an answer.  It states that ‘[a] class action may be maintained’ if two conditions are 
met:  The suit must satisfy the criteria set forth in subdivision (a) (i.e., numerosity, commonality, 
typicality, and adequacy of representation), and it also must fit into one of the three categories 
described in subdivision (b).  FED. RULE CIV. PROC. 23(b).  By its terms this creates a categorical 
rule entitling a plaintiff whose suit meets the specified criteria to pursue his claim as a class action 
. . . .  Thus, Rule 23 provides a one-size-fits-all formula for deciding the class-action question.”).   
 138. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text. 
 139. “Allstate points out that Congress has carved out some federal claims from Rule 23's 
reach, see, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(1)(B)—which shows, Allstate contends, that Rule 23 does not 
authorize class actions for all claims, but rather leaves room for laws like § 901(b).”  Shady Grove, 
130 S. Ct. at 1438.  
 140. Id. at 1438.   
 141. Id. at 1437. 
 142. Id. at 1442-44. 
 143. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.  He thus effectively asked whether the Rule 
by its terms addressed any matter of substantive law, rejecting state law having any role in that 
inquiry.  This exemplifies what I call the “explicitness approach.”  See infra notes 144-45 and 
accompanying text.  Because of that position, he rejected the dissent’s attempt to buttress its 
argument by reference to the New York statute’s legislative history.  Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 
1440.  Whether one agrees with him or not, the opinion is reasonably straightforward.   
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Rule 23 and, seeing nothing that purported to address substantive issues 
of law, ended the REA inquiry.144  
This approach may imply that Justice Scalia prefers the explicitness 
approach:  a Federal Rule is substantive for REA purposes only if it 
purports to address substantive rights.  Under such an approach, it is not 
hard to understand why the Court has never invalidated one of the 
Federal Rules:  none has ever explicitly addressed any substantive right.  
On the other hand, Justice Scalia acknowledges that the Court’s history 
demonstrates a restrained reading of Federal Rules in order to avoid 
REA problems.  If the Court had adopted the explicitness approach, 
restrained reading would never be necessary; the decision would turn 
solely on the text of the Federal Rule, not on its consequential effects. 
B. Justice Stevens 
By contrast, Justice Stevens asked whether the state rule is 
substantive.145  He made his method unmistakable when he threw down 
the gauntlet to the dissent:  “If my dissenting colleagues feel strongly 
that § 901(b) is substantive and that class certification should be denied, 
then they should argue within the Enabling Act's framework.  Otherwise, 
‘the Federal Rule applies regardless of contrary state law.’”146  
 
 144. In some cases, there could be a third question for Justice Scalia to ask.  Were he to find 
that the Federal Rule violated REA, that would not end the vertical-choice-of-law inquiry.  The 
matter then becomes whether the federal courts should create a federal common law rule—in other 
words, whether there is some dominant federal interest that mandates displacing state law.  (This is 
also the question when there is no Federal Rule that purports to address the question.)  Note, 
however, that this is an RDA inquiry—the “relatively unguided Erie choice,” Hanna v. Plumer, 380 
U.S. 460, 471 (1965), not a part of the REA analysis.   
 145. He concluded that it is not.  Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1448 (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment) (“The New York law at issue . . . is a procedural rule that is 
not part of New York’s substantive law.  Accordingly, I agree with Justice Scalia that Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 23 must apply in this case and join Parts I and II-A of the Court’s opinion.  But I 
also agree with Justice Ginsburg that there are some state procedural rules that federal courts must 
apply in diversity cases because they function as a part of the State's definition of substantive rights 
and remedies.” (citation omitted)).  He relied in part on section 901’s placement in New York’s 
Civil Practice Law and Rules.  See supra text accompanying note 107.  “[In Justice Stevens’s] view, 
however, the bar for finding an Enabling Act problem is a high one.  The mere fact that a state law 
is designed as a procedural rule suggests it reflects a judgment about how state courts ought to 
operate and not a judgment about the scope of state-created rights and remedies.”  Shady Grove, 130 
S. Ct. at 1457 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  That seems a thin 
reed upon which to rely, but the important thing about the statement is that it seems to support 
Justice Scalia’s assertion that Justice Stevens was asking a different (and in Justice Scalia’s view 
incorrect) question. 
 146. Id. (citation omitted).  Arguably, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent does exactly what Justice 
Stevens requested.  See supra notes 110-27 and accompanying text. 
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Justice Stevens also recognized that procedural rules can have 
substantive effects (or even, in the case of state procedural rules, 
substantive purposes).147  That they may have incidental substantive 
effects is not surprising; the Court discussed that phenomenon in Hanna 
v. Plumer148 when it noted (reflecting the influence of Guaranty Trust’s 
outcome-determinative approach) that virtually any procedural rule can 
affect substantive rights.149  Outcome-determinativeness was Guaranty 
Trust’s litmus test for whether the vertical choice-of-law inquiry 
involved something substantive or procedural.  By that measure, statutes 
of limitation became substantive for Erie purposes.  Justice Harlan, 
concurring in Hanna, was more explicit: 
The Court is quite right in stating that the “outcome-determinative” 
test of Guaranty Trust . . . , if taken literally, proves too much, for any 
rule, no matter how clearly “procedural,” can affect the outcome of 
litigation if it is not obeyed.  In turning from the “outcome” test of 
York back to the unadorned forum-shopping rationale of Erie, 
however, the Court falls prey to like oversimplification, for a simple 
forum-shopping rule also proves too much; litigants often choose a 
federal forum merely to obtain what they consider the advantages of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or to try their cases before a 
supposedly more favorable judge. To my mind the proper line of 
approach in determining whether to apply a state or a federal rule, 
whether “substantive” or “procedural,” is to stay close to basic 
principles by inquiring if the choice of rule would substantially affect 
those primary decisions respecting human conduct which our 
constitutional system leaves to state regulation.150 
Justice Harlan appeared to view rules as substantive if they affect 
the way people live their day-to-day lives and conduct their worldly 
affairs in light of the law, i.e., non-litigation conduct.  As I will suggest 
 
 147. See supra note 103.  Justice Stevens made those observations as part of his argument that 
in service of the Erie doctrine’s policy, the Court should not limit itself to characterizing only the 
Federal Rule as substantive or procedural.  See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.   
 148. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
 149. Id. at 464-65 (“Undoubtedly most alterations of the rules of practice and procedure may 
and often do affect the rights of litigants.  Congress’ prohibition of any alteration of substantive 
rights of litigants was obviously not addressed to such incidental effects as necessarily attend the 
adoption of the prescribed new rules of procedure upon the rights of litigants who, agreeably to 
rules of practice and procedure, have been brought before a court authorized to determine their 
rights. . . . The fact that the application of Rule 4(f) will operate to subject petitioner’s rights to 
adjudication by the district court for northern Mississippi will undoubtedly affect those rights.  But 
it does not operate to abridge, enlarge or modify the rules of decision by which that court will 
adjudicate its rights.” (citation omitted)). 
 150. Id. at 475 (Harlan, J., concurring).   
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later,151 Justice Harlan’s approach probably should become the majority 
rule, but it needs a bit of refinement. 
Justice Stevens, however, thought the first question should be 
whether the state rule was substantive or procedural.152  He concluded 
that section 901(b) is procedural.153  Although he agreed with Justice 
 
 151. See infra notes 306-307 and accompanying text. 
 152. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1448 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment).  Professor Ely agreed: 
If this wholesale defeat of the Enabling Act is to be avoided, its interpretation must be 
geared not to the lawsuit's ultimate outcome, but rather to the character of the state 
provision that enforcement of the Federal Rule in question will supplant, in particular to 
whether the state provision embodies a substantive policy or represents only a procedural 
disagreement with the federal rulemakers respecting the fairest and most efficient way of 
conducting litigation. 
Ely, supra note 9, at 722. 
 153. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The New York law 
at issue . . . is a procedural rule that is not part of New York’s substantive law.  Accordingly, I agree 
with Justice Scalia that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 must apply in this case and join Parts I 
and II-A of the Court’s opinion.  But I also agree with Justice Ginsburg that there are some state 
procedural rules that federal courts must apply in diversity cases because they function as a part of 
the State's definition of substantive rights and remedies.” (citation omitted)).  He relied in part on 
section 901’s placement in New York’s Civil Practice Law and Rules.  Id. at 1457 (“In my view, 
however, the bar for finding an Enabling Act problem is a high one.  The mere fact that a state law 
is designed as a procedural rule suggests it reflects a judgment about how state courts ought to 
operate and not a judgment about the scope of state-created rights and remedies.”).  That seems a 
thin reed upon which to rely, but the important thing about the statement is that it seems to support 
Justice Scalia’s assertion that Justice Stevens was asking a different (and in Justice Scalia’s view 
incorrect) question. 
  Statutes of limitation usually appear in state procedural codes, but the Court, despite 
having abandoned Guaranty Trust’s outcome-determinative litmus test, nonetheless remains faithful 
to its holding that limitations periods are substantive for Erie purposes.  See Doernberg, supra note 
11, at 630.  The most definitive federal judicial statement on the classification of limitations for 
choice-of-law purposes, Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Co., 220 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1955), noted that 
placement of a limitations period in the same statute that created the plaintiff’s right should be a key 
factor in deciding whether the courts should regard the limitation as substantive or procedural.  
“‘The common case [where limitations are treated as “substantive”] is where a statute creates a new 
liability, and in the same section or in the same act limits the time within which it can be enforced, 
whether using words of condition or not.’”  Id. at 155 (quoting Justice Holmes’s majority opinion in 
Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 454 (1904)). 
  Applying state limitations periods to state-created claims is proper and entirely consonant 
with the balancing approach that the Court now uses (but without explicit acknowledgement) in all 
Erie cases.  There is no federal limitations statute that applies to state-created claims, so the matter 
comes down to Byrd balancing.  There is no dominant federal interest that requires ousting the state 
rule.  See Doernberg, supra note 11, at 647.  (Congress might bestir itself to enact federal limitations 
periods to apply in diversity cases.  Such a statute would almost certainly pass constitutional muster.  
There is a discernible federal interest in how long federal courts remain open to increasingly stale 
claims, given all the problems of proof that they present.  Therefore, Congress could effectively 
make statutes of limitations procedural for Erie purposes.  See Ely, supra note 9, at 726-27 (positing 
that while Congress could enact such a statute, for a Federal Rule to attempt the same thing would 
violate REA)).   
26
Akron Law Review, Vol. 44 [2011], Iss. 4, Art. 7
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol44/iss4/7
12-DOERNBERG_44.4_8.7.11_DONE-9.2.11.DOC 9/12/2011  8:46 AM 
2011] “THE TEMPEST” 1173 
Scalia that Rule 23 and section 901(b) directly collided, his decision that 
section 901(b) is procedural meant that he saw no REA problem in Rule 
23 displacing section 901(b).154 
As between Justice Scalia’s and Justice Stevens’s views, Justice 
Scalia has the simpler argument, though not necessarily the better one.  
He argued that REA directs attention to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, not to state rules.  That is an over-simplification.  REA’s 
reference to “any substantive right” commands attention to the sovereign 
that created the supposed substantive right—in Shady Grove, the State of 
New York in section 901(b).  By ignoring that, Justice Scalia recreates 
the anti-positivist fallacy by assuming that the terms “substantive” and 
“procedural” have fixed meanings independent of the sovereigns who 
create the rules.  Criticizing Justice Stevens’s approach, Part II-C of 
Justice Scalia’s opinion said: 
Instead of a single hard question of whether a Federal Rule regulates 
substance or procedure, that approach will present hundreds of hard 
questions, forcing federal courts to assess the substantive or procedural 
character of countless state rules that may conflict with a single 
Federal Rule.  And it still does not sidestep the problem it seeks to 
avoid.  At the end of the day, one must come face to face with the 
decision whether or not the state policy (with which a putatively 
procedural state rule may be “bound up”) pertains to a “substantive 
right or remedy,”—that is, whether it is substance or procedure.155 
It is as if substance and procedure exist in a vacuum, as 
independent concepts capable of application to worldly things like 
statutes, rules and goals.  Ironically, Justice Scalia took his position in 
purported service of the goals of vertical choice-of-law that Erie both 
articulated and spawned, but in doing so, he implicitly rejected the 
greatest jurisprudential change that Erie ushered in:  the rejection of 
natural law in favor of legal positivism. 
Justice Stevens’s position was that one cannot conclusively tell 
whether a Federal Rule impermissibly affects a substantive right without 
looking to the source of the supposed right and considering whether the 
right-creating sovereign sought to address substantive goals—the kinds 
of things to which Justice Harlan referred as dealing “the primary 
conduct and affairs of its citizens.”156  His reasoning is persuasive.  If 
 
 154. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1448 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 155. Id. at 1447 (Scalia, J., for himself, the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas) (citations and 
footnotes omitted). 
 156. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 476 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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sovereigns create rules of law, then we cannot know whether a particular 
rule is substantive or procedural without considering its purpose, and 
only the sovereign establishing the rule can define that. 
C. Justice Ginsburg 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, while purporting to rely heavily on her 
majority opinion in Gasperini, overlooked important differences 
between Gasperini and Shady Grove.157  She interpreted section 901(b) 
as a substantive limitation the New York legislature intended on 
Allstate’s total exposure to damages.158  I beg to differ.  It is a mistake to 
read section 901(b) in isolation from the rest of New York law, which 
permits either joint trial or consolidation of “actions involving a 
common question of law or fact. . . .”159  There is no limit on the amount 
recoverable; a defendant in multiple penalty cases might face just as 
large a loss as the one Justice Ginsburg inferred the New York 
legislature feared.160  Even if neither the plaintiffs nor the court seek 
consolidation, the defendant may161 choose the perceived economic 
advantage of defending one action rather than many, recognizing that it 
faces the same amount of risk.  The total exposure of a defendant in 
Allstate’s position is nowhere limited, even by implication, in New York 
law.  At worst, potential class members would have to bring individual 
 
 157. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1463, 1469, 1471-72 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  I recognize the 
danger in suggesting that a Justice misconstrued her former opinion, especially a sitting Justice with 
respect to a relatively recent opinion.  In American National Red Cross v. Solicitor General, 505 
U.S. 247 (1992), Justice Scalia made a similar assertion about two opinions that Chief Justice John 
Marshall wrote.  See id. at 268-72 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Souter’s majority opinion 
responded:  “The dissent accuses us of repeating what it announces as Chief Justice Marshall’s 
misunderstanding, in Osborn, of his own previous opinion in Deveaux.  We are honored.”  Id. at 
256 n.7.  But I persist. 
 158. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 159. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 602(a) (McKinney 2006).  That statute emphasizes the importance New 
York attaches to being able to join or consolidate similar cases.  It permits higher courts hearing a 
case to transfer to themselves qualifying cases pending in lower courts.  N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 602(b) 
(McKinney 2006) 
 160. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 161. § 602(a) (“the court, upon motion, may order a joint trial of any or all the matters in issue, 
may order the actions consolidated, and may make such other orders. . . .”).  A defendant in 
Allstate’s position might see economic advantage in doing so, because defense of the consolidated 
action might cost significantly less than defense of numerous individual actions.  This is less risky 
in New York than it might appear, since New York recognizes offensive non-mutual collateral 
estoppel, see B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 225 N.E.2d 195 (N.Y. 1967), which would allow individual 
plaintiffs in separate cases presenting the same issues to preclude Allstate from retrying those 
issues. 
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actions.  If the legislature was attempting to limit the total liability of 
statutory-penalty sufferers, it left no other indications of that intention. 
There is a more fundamental difference between Gasperini and 
Shady Grove.162  In Gasperini, New York law163 established an 
absolute, though hard-to-calculate, range of liability:  immaterial 
deviation from reasonable compensation.164  The statute directs New 
York courts to adjust jury verdicts outside that range to come within it.  
“Reasonable compensation” is a dollar amount, as is “material 
deviation.”  Those two amounts may vary from case to case, but that is 
beside the point; the critical matter is that in each case, the court places a 
value on each term, and the sum of those values (deviation upward) and 
their difference (deviation downward) are numbers.  Contrast that with 
section 901(b), which places no monetary limit on recovery for statutory 
penalties.165  It merely means that plaintiffs must recover penalties in 
separate (or consolidated) actions rather than in a class action.  Whatever 
section 901(b) is, it is not a legal limit on the maximum exposure to 
damages that a defendant faces.  Part of the Gasperini rule clearly was.  
Thus, the dissent’s comparison of Gasperini and Shady Grove is forced.  
Ultimately, it fails. 
The dissent tends to conflate different parts of the statute involved 
in Gasperini.  For example, Justice Ginsburg noted the Gasperini 
Court’s sensitivity to New York’s policy, stating,  “[t]his Court held that 
Rule 59(a) did not inhibit federal-court accommodation of New York’s 
invigorated test.”166  From that language, one might infer that the 
Gasperini Court simply applied section 5501(c), but it did not.  The 
statute prescribed two things:  (1) a different measure of jury-verdict 
excessiveness, migrating from the shock-the-conscience test to the 
deviates-materially test, and (2) a mandate to New York’s intermediate 
appellate courts to review on that basis.167  Gasperini carefully 
distinguished the two, noting that the New York law was both 
substantive and procedural.168  The Shady Grove dissent’s reference to 
 
 162. Both cases, coincidentally, involved New York law. 
 163. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c) (McKinney 1995 & Supp. 2010). 
 164. See supra text accompanying note 120. 
 165. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b) (McKinney 2006). 
 166. Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1463 
(Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (2010). 
 167. § 901(b). 
 168. Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 426 (1996) (“As the parties’ 
arguments suggest, CPLR § 5501(c), appraised under Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins . . . and decisions in 
Erie’s path, is both ‘substantive’ and ‘procedural’:  ‘substantive’ in that § 5501(c)’s ‘deviates ma-
terially’ standard controls how much a plaintiff can be awarded; ‘procedural’ in that § 5501(c) 
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“[t]he provision held ‘substantive’ for Erie purposes in Gasperini,” 
elided the fact that Justice Ginsburg pointedly refused to apply its 
procedural facet.169   
The dissent also relied on an unstated syllogism.  The major 
premise is that all remedies are substantive for REA purposes.  The 
minor premise is that section 901’s class action device is a remedy and 
section 901(b) makes that remedy unavailable to Shady Grove.  The 
conclusion is that section 901(b) is substantive for REA purposes.170  
Such a view requires overruling Sibbach.  There, Illinois law did not 
permit compelling the plaintiff in a personal injury action to submit to a 
 
assigns decisionmaking authority to New York’s Appellate Division.  Parallel application of § 
5501(c) at the federal appellate level would be out of sync with the federal system’s division of trial 
and appellate court functions, an allocation weighted by the Seventh Amendment.  The dispositive 
question, therefore, is whether federal courts can give effect to the substantive thrust of § 5501(c) 
without untoward alteration of the federal scheme for the trial and decision of civil cases.”). 
  The procedural problem that troubled the Gasperini Court may not be as severe as the 
Court feared.  The implicit assumption the Court appears to make is that “reasonable compensation” 
is a question of pure fact.  There is much in the law, however, to suggest that it is at least a mixed 
question of law and fact, and one should not automatically assume that anything with a 
reasonableness standard is necessarily a question of fact within the jury’s exclusive domain, or that 
even something that is a pure question of fact is for the jury to decide.  For example, Ohio v. 
Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 40 (1996), held that the issue of whether a defendant’s purported consent to 
a search was actually voluntary, though a question of fact, was for the court to decide.  Ever since 
the Court announced Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the question of whether the police officer 
who initiates a Terry stop had “reasonable suspicion” upon which to do so has been a question for 
the court, not the jury.  Fourth Amendment “unreasonableness” itself has always been a 
determination for the court to make, and United States Reporter fairly bristles with cases in which 
the Court has made that determination at the very highest level of appellate review.  The Seventh 
Amendment, of course, has no application in the criminal context, but it would be a mistake to 
conclude that the courts’ treating reasonableness as at least a mixed question of law and fact is 
limited to that sphere. 
  Civil practice in the federal courts recognizes reasonableness as a matter of law eligible 
for judicial decision. 
It is a well-established principle of the common law that although questions of fact must 
be decided by the jury . . . the question of whether there is sufficient evidence to raise a 
question of fact to be presented to the jury is a question of law that must be decided by 
the court. 
9B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2522, 
at 226 (2008).  Federal Rules 50 and 56, among others depend on that.  Under Federal Rule 50, the 
court may grant judgment as a matter of law if “a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient 
evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue. . . .”  FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1).  Rule 56 adopts 
the same standard for summary judgments.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 56A; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (Rule 56 standard “mirrors” Rule 50 standard).  See also Weisgram 
v. Marley, 528 U.S. 440 (2000) (allowing Court of Appeals to direct district to enter judgment as a 
matter of law in favor of jury verdict loser). 
 169. See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 431-39. 
 170. Under that analysis, a conflicting Federal Rule would violate REA, but Justice Ginsburg 
found no conflict in Shady Grove.  See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text. 
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physical examination.171  Surely the right of personal privacy embodied 
in such a rule is substantive as Justice Ginsburg uses the term.  It is at 
least as substantive as section 901(b)’s freedom-from-class-action 
entitlement.  Sibbach could not find a way to avoid the collision between 
Illinois law and Rule 35.  The wording of Rule 35, then172 as now,173 
paralleled the wording of Rule 23.  Both describe district court power in 
permissive terms and specify criteria.  Neither suggests any exception in 
the case of conflicting state law.  Yet Justice Ginsburg neither 
distinguished nor suggested overruling Sibbach.174 
It is possible that the major premise is overbroad.  A common 
definition of remedy is “[t]he means of enforcing a right or preventing or 
redressing a wrong; legal or equitable relief.”175  Note, however, that 
“the” definition really is two.  The first part sounds like it fits section 
 
 171.  Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 7 (1941). 
 172. Id. at 8 (“In an action in which the mental or physical condition of a party is in 
controversy, the court in which the action is pending may order him to submit to a physical or 
mental examination by a physician.  The order may be made only on motion for good cause shown 
and upon notice to the party to be examined and to all other parties and shall specify the time, place, 
manner, conditions, and scope of the examination and the person or persons by whom it is to be 
made.” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 35(a) (amended 1970))). 
 173. See FED. R. CIV. P. 35(a). 
 174. She also did not suggest that the Court erred in Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Woods, 480 
U.S. 1 (1987).  Plaintiffs brought a diversity personal injury action sounding in Alabama tort law 
against the railroad and recovered a jury verdict.  State law required a 10% penalty for unsuccessful 
appeals of money judgments.  ALA. CODE § 12-22-72 (1986).  When the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, 
it imposed the penalty.  Burlington sought Supreme Court review, and a unanimous Court reversed, 
holding that Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 governed in place of the Alabama law.  
Burlington, 480 U.S. at 7.  The penalty statute, according to Justice Marshall, existed “to penalize 
frivolous appeals and appeals interposed for delay, . . . and to provide ‘additional damages’ as 
compensation to the appellees for having to suffer the ordeal of defending the judgments on 
appeal.”  Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 4 (citations omitted).  Rule 38 makes an award of 
damages and additional costs for a frivolous appeal a matter of the court’s discretion.  The Court 
adopted the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning with respect to a similar Mississippi statute, Burlington 
Northern, 480 U.S. at 6-7 (citing Affholder, Inc. v. Southern Rock, Inc., 746 F.2d 305 (5th Cir. 
1984)), emphasizing the discretionary nature of the federal remedy and its application only to 
frivolous appeals rather than to all unsuccessful appeals of money judgments. 
  Justice Ginsburg might respond that the collision in Burlington Northern was 
unavoidable, whereas she argued strongly in Shady Grove that the collision between Rule 23 and 
section 901(b) was avoidable.  Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1465-66 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  I 
suggest that would overstate the case.  Both of the federal rules are permissive and appear to fly in 
the face of mandatory state rules that deny flexibility.  In addition, Rule 23’s effect is not 
substantive, as Justice Ginsburg would have it, because it does not speak to the defendant’s total 
liability for violations of New York’s prompt-payment statute.  See supra notes 157-64 and 
accompanying text.  See infra text accompanying note 332.  One can dispute, therefore, that 
section 901(b) is substantive for REA purposes, but there is no gainsaying that the Alabama penalty 
statute in Burlington addressed itself directly to the total amount of damages a plaintiff could 
recover. 
 175. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1407-08 (9th ed. 2009). 
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901(b) because one could take “means” to refer to procedural devices, 
such as the class action or other forms of claim or party joinder.  The 
second part does not fit; it speaks not of devices but rather of damages 
and equitable relief.  Interestingly, almost all of the more specific 
definitions subsumed under “remedy” speak of the goal of the litigation, 
whether legal or equitable, not of the procedural devices the plaintiff 
employs to achieve those goals.176 
If Rule 23 is a remedy, it is difficult to see why any Federal Rule 
concerning joinder of claims or parties is not similarly a remedy.177  
That is certainly not the way in which one commonly thinks of the 
joinder devices.  Moreover, there is considerable case law, unmentioned 
in the dissent, approving the applicability of the federal joinder rules 
despite state law that is either silent or explicitly to the contrary.178 
VI.  THE TEMPEST THAT IS SHADY GROVE 
A. A (Very) Brief Review of Some Scholarly Commentary on REA 
There is voluminous commentary on REA.  Much of it criticizes 
Sibbach179 and the Court’s repetition of the Sibbach test in Hanna.180  
Most of it talks about how to approach making the distinction between 
substance and procedure in individual cases, both those that have arisen 
and those that might arise.  Professor Ely, for example, while generally 
approving Justice Harlan’s primary-conduct approach from his Hanna 
concurrence, thought it did not go far enough: 
For one thing, we probably should give “conduct” a coverage 
somewhat broader than that the term most naturally suggests, to 
include along with the encouragement of actual activity the fostering 
and protection of certain states of mind—for example, the feeling of 
release, the assurance that the possibility of ordeal has passed, that a 
state seeks to create by enacting a statute of limitations. Beyond that, 
we surely would want to count as substantive various sorts of 
immunizing laws—such as sovereign immunity and abatement laws, 
 
 176. See id. at 1320-21. 
 177. See FED. R. CIV. P. 13, 14, 18, 19, 20, 22, 24, 25. 
 178. See supra note 100.  I acknowledge Justice Ginsburg’s statement that “the Second Circuit 
and every District Court to have considered the question in any detail” all agreed that section 901(b) 
was substantive for REA purposes.  Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1465 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(footnote omitted).  The difficulty with it is that none of the cases to which she refers discussed 
those precedents either. 
 179. See, e.g., Redish & Murashko, supra note 35, at 58. 
 180. See infra text accompanying notes 181-82. 
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married women and spendthrift statutes—which surely are not 
calculated to encourage those immunized to engage in the conduct 
involved, conduct for which the rest of us would be liable.  They are, 
instead, based upon a judgment that although the conduct involved is 
undesirable and indeed ought to be deterred, other and, in context, 
more important goals will be served by immunization from liability.  
Yet the laws remain substantive: in none is the “greater” goal to which 
the interests in deterrence and compensation are subordinated a 
procedural goal concerned only with the most sensible way to manage 
a litigation process.181 
He noted with approval the Court’s “recent appreciation that the 
Enabling Act constitutes the only check on the Rules—that ‘Erie’ does 
not stand there as a backstop . . .”182 and then argued that the Court 
should “take the [Enabling] Act’s limiting language more seriously than 
it has in the past . . . .”183  He clearly thought that the Hanna Court had 
done a disservice in limiting its discussion of an REA test to the 
“arguably procedural” standard, as Justice Harlan characterized it.184  He 
criticized Sibbach as unrealistically viewing substance and procedure as 
mutually exclusive concepts,185 and argued that Sibbach’s really-
regulates-procedure standard ignored REA’s limiting language.186  But 
he also offered definitions of procedure and substance. 
[A] procedural rule is . . . one designed to make the process of 
litigation a fair and efficient mechanism for the resolution of disputes 
. . . .  The most helpful way, it seems to me, of defining a substantive 
rule—or more particularly a substantive right, which is what the Act 
refers to—is as a right granted for one or more nonprocedural reasons, 
 
 181. Ely, supra note 9, at 726 (footnotes omitted).   
 182. Id. at 698.   
 183. Id. 
 184. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 476 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“So long as a 
reasonable man could characterize any duly adopted federal rule as ‘procedural,’ the Court, unless I 
misapprehend what is said, would have it apply no matter how seriously it frustrated a State’s 
substantive regulation of the primary conduct and affairs of its citizens.  Since the members of the 
Advisory Committee, the Judicial Conference, and this Court who formulated the Federal Rules are 
presumably reasonable men, it follows that the integrity of the Federal Rules is absolute.  Whereas 
the unadulterated outcome and forum-shopping tests may err too far toward honoring state rules, I 
submit that the Court’s ‘arguably procedural, ergo constitutional’ test moves too fast and far in the 
other direction.”). 
 185. Ely, supra note 9, at 719. 
 186. Id. at 723 (noting REA’s limiting language in its “second sentence (the one the Court and 
the commentators have ignored)”).   
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for some purpose or purposes not having to do with the fairness or 
efficiency of the litigation process.187 
The difficulty with these formulations is their underlying 
assumption that a rule has only one purpose, or at least one primary 
purpose.  The former is often not true.  The latter is true, at least by 
definition, but the difficulty inheres in discerning what the “primary” 
purpose of a statute or rule is.  Ely recognized that rules may have 
multiple purposes, some substantive and some procedural, but he offered 
no way to deal with such rules.  Although offering numerous examples 
in which state rules that appear procedural on their face might 
nonetheless have some substantive purpose,188 he did not suggest a 
particular method for determining which of several possible goals a state 
rule embodies.189  What is missing is any sort of inductive conclusion 
about how federal courts considering REA challenges should proceed in 
their thinking.  In the end, therefore, he left the courts with what seems 
like an ad hoc approach to these difficult questions. 
Professor Burbank, whose exhaustive study190 of the history of 
REA in the decades leading up to its enactment in 1934 gives the reader 
a clear understanding of just how difficult it was to get congressional 
approval for a system of uniform federal judicial procedure, left a similar 
gap.  He made a persuasive case that the concerns motivating REA’s 
limiting language related only to the allocation of power between 
Congress and the Supreme Court, not to problems concerning the 
intersection of federal and state law.191  He analyzed each of the areas in 
which controversies concerning the legitimacy of a Federal Rule under 
REA have arisen.  In some cases, he disagreed with the Court’s result; in 
others he concurred.  He did a masterful job of discussing the cases that 
have arisen under Federal Rules 3, 4, 15, 17, 35 and 37. 
One is left, however, at the end of the article, with the same kinds 
of questions that linger after Professor Ely’s study.  Three quarters of a 
century after Congress passed REA, we still lack an analytical technique 
for making the admittedly difficult decisions about whether something is 
 
 187. Id. at 724-25 (footnotes omitted). 
 188. See id. at 726-38.   
 189. At this point one might begin to appreciate more fully Justice Scalia’s philosophy of 
legislative interpretation, which shuns resort to legislative history (often sparse at the state level) in 
favor of attempting to discern a statute’s purpose from its own language, not the individual 
expressions of lawmakers or committees as a possible guide to what the statutory language means.  
See generally Scalia, supra note 14.  The difficulty is that the statutory language may give an 
insufficient clue about a statute’s purposes. 
 190. See Burbank, supra note 35. 
 191. See infra text accompanying note 316. 
34
Akron Law Review, Vol. 44 [2011], Iss. 4, Art. 7
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol44/iss4/7
12-DOERNBERG_44.4_8.7.11_DONE-9.2.11.DOC 9/12/2011  8:46 AM 
2011] “THE TEMPEST” 1181 
substantive or procedural for REA purposes where rational arguments 
exist for either characterization.  Professor Burbank does suggest an 
approach.  “The history suggests, at the least, a prohibition against 
Federal Rules that have an effect on rights recognized by the substantive 
law that is predictable and identifiable.”192  The problem with the 
formulation is that it is essentially question-begging.  It presumes a 
common understanding of the term “substantive law” without seeming 
to acknowledge that the language has different meanings in different 
contexts.  One need look no further than Professor Ely’s article193 to find 
acknowledgement that the term has different meanings for RDA and 
REA purposes. 
Professor Carrington agreed with Professor Burbank that the 
limiting language of REA reflects Congress’s concerns about separation-
of-powers, not federalism.194  Echoing Walter Wheeler Cook, he 
cautioned against viewing “substance” or “procedure” as terms of 
mutually exclusive and immutable meaning, noting that “the 
characterization of a law as substantive or procedural depends on the 
purpose of the characterization.”195  He then tried to discern a purpose of 
the second sentence of the original REA, the one with the limiting 
language, but ultimately concluded that it may have been unnecessary, 
but “more likely is a reflection of Congress's awareness that the terms 
‘substance’ and ‘procedure’ are not mutually exclusive.”196  By way of 
demonstration, he discussed how statutes of limitation fit both 
categories, characterizing limitations rules as “neither grass nor hay, 
being at once both substantive and procedural.”197 
Professor Carrington criticized Hanna for failing to appreciate “the 
separation of powers issue that lay under the surface of the Rules 
Enabling Act but was concealed by the fashionable preoccupation with 
Erie.”198  He thought that Burlington Northern did a better job, but was 
still unsatisfied.  He proposed a working test that drew on Cook’s 
teachings: 
 
 192. Burbank, supra note 35, at 1160.   
 193. See Ely, supra note 9, at 698.   
 194. Carrington, supra note 35, at 283 (“The concern expressed in Congress was that an 
expansive reading might be given to the statutory term ‘procedure’ to enable a court rule to override 
political decisions made by Congress.”).   
 195. Id. at 284 (footnote omitted).   
 196. Id. at 287.   
 197. Id. at 290. 
 198. Id. at 298.   
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[A] rule is functionally one of “practice and procedure,” within the 
meaning of the first sentence, if the rule pertains to the operation of the 
federal courts and is integrated in a system generally applicable to all 
civil actions and suitably designed to achieve “just, speedy, and 
inexpensive” determinations.  Such a rule does not affect a substantive 
right, within the meaning of the second sentence of the Act, if its 
application is sufficiently broad to evoke no organized political 
attention of a group of litigants or prospective litigants who 
(reasonably) claim to be specially and adversely affected by the 
rule.199  
It is difficult to see how such an approach would work in practice.  
As Professor Carrington pointed out,200 interest groups have the six-
month window201 between formal proposal of a rule and congressional 
acquiescence in it (at least by inaction) in which to make their arguments 
against it.  He argues that REA’s supersession clause provides ample 
incentive for opposition to a rule that overreaches.202  That might be an 
effective oversight mechanism for rules the Court designed to affect 
identifiable substantive rights associated with particular groups in the 
political culture.203  The approach appears to assume, however, that 
every substantive right has one or more champions in the political arena, 
a proposition that is by no means certain. 
Leaving the question of what is substantive for REA purposes to 
the political process creates another problem as well.  It is not clear what 
the relevant point in time is.  If a proposed rule survives the six-month 
waiting period without successful organized political opposition, should 
that function as the conclusive determination that the rule is not 
substantive within the meaning of REA’s limiting language, or would a 
 
 199. Id. at 308.   
 200. Id. at 323. 
 201. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (2006) (requiring that the Supreme Court transmit proposed rules to 
Congress by May 1 of the year in which rules are to take effect and providing that they not take 
effect before December 1 unless Congress provides otherwise). 
 202. See Carrington, supra note 35, at 323. 
 203. Some might argue that Congress is unlikely to peruse proposed rules sufficiently to 
provide an efficient check on Supreme Court overreaching.  Perhaps that is so, although the initial 
experience with the Federal Rules of Evidence suggests that the concern is overstated.  See, e.g., 
Ely, supra note 9, at 693 (“The ones I feel sorry for are the people who paid $150 for the cassette 
tapes explaining the Federal Rules of Evidence.  It is hard to say it was their own fault:  everything 
certainly seemed to be going according to plan.  The Rules had been forwarded to the Supreme 
Court by the Advisory Committee, and the Court had duly blessed them and sent them on to 
Congress.  That meant that unless something went wrong, they would automatically take effect on 
July 1, 1973.  Something went wrong, however.  A statute was passed preventing the Rules from 
taking effect unless another statute approved them, and they were referred to committee.” (footnotes 
omitted)).  
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litigant subject to the rule be able to argue that it violates REA?  In other 
words, does six months of calm betoken that, with respect to a particular 
rule, there can be no storm?  Perhaps this is what Professor Carrington 
intends, but it seems to place in the hands of an imprecisely defined 
group the practical power to foreclose by inaction a non-member’s 
entitlement to rely on REA’s limiting language (whatever it may mean). 
Professor Redish and Mr. Murashko implicitly criticize the 
scholarly community with respect to its inability to formulate a 
generalized working standard under REA’s limiting language.  “[W]hen 
dealing with ambiguous legislation, it is common sense and an attempt 
to translate underlying purpose into legal reality, rather than narrow, 
shortsighted adherence to textual literalism or legislative history, that 
more effectively further the goals of representative democracy.”204  
Their article has a dual purpose:  first, to teach a lesson about statutory 
interpretation in general, and second, positing a reading of REA that 
gives the limiting-language clause independent meaning rather than 
suggesting, as one interpretive approach to REA does,205 that the clause 
is surplusage. 
Redish and Murashko denominate the first section of REA “the 
enabling provision” and the second as “the limiting provision.”206  The 
article sets out “three plausible interpretations of a synthesis of the two 
provisions.”207  First, there is the “redundancy” construction, which 
views the limiting language as surplusage, expressing no more than the 
negative of the enabling language.208  Second, they posit the “strict 
separation” reading, which means “that having any effect whatsoever on 
a substantive right will invalidate a rule.”209  They note that no Court 
majority has ever formed around this view, though Professors Ely and 
Burbank appear to favor it.210  Third, they identify as a separate 
approach that they call “relaxed separation,” characterizing it as a 
variation on the strict separation approach by permitting Federal Rules to 
have an “incidental effect” on substantive rights.  Burlington Northern, 
they say, essentially adopted this approach, but they criticize the Court 
 
 204. Redish & Murashko, supra note 35, at 95. 
 205. Id. at 36-37. 
 206. Id. at 35, 36. 
 207. Id. at 36.   
 208. They include a discussion of why the familiar canon of statutory interpretation 
discouraging such an interpretation of any statute should not give pause in the case of REA.  See id. 
at 37-38. 
 209. Id. at 29. 
 210. Id.  One might wonder whether Justice Ginsburg’s outcome-affective approach implicitly 
adopts this view.  See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
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for “not explain[ing] why the relaxed separation construction should 
prevail over the other two.”211  Nonetheless, they adopt this approach 
because it “most effectively promotes the two background purposes of 
the Enabling Act,”212 which they identify as “(1) creating a uniform and 
effective system of procedural rules for the federal courts, while (2) 
preserving the substantive lawmaking power for Congress, free from 
challenge or threat from the Supreme Court’s newly created rulemaking 
authority.”213 
That is well enough, but it seems to me that it still leaves hanging 
the question of what is substantive and what is procedural for REA 
purposes.  Redish and Murashko appear to approve of Professor Ely’s 
formulations.214  In one way, that is ironic, since they also criticize the 
mutually-exclusive view of the terms.215  They seem to assume, as do 
their colleagues discussed above, that there is some commonly 
understood distinction (fuzzy at times) between the two.  But the 
absence of a working definition or common understanding of those 
terms has created the uncertainty and dissatisfaction with the Court’s 
approach to REA problems from Sibbach to Burlington Northern.  There 
is no reason to think that Shady Grove will in any way alleviate those 
feelings; if anything, it will intensify them. 
B. A Better Way, with Thanks to Justice Harlan 
The burden of the critic, at least in the minds if not the words of 
those upon whom he inflicts his views, is to come up with something 
better.  The first question is whether the text of the Federal Rule actually 
addresses the precise choice-of-law issue the court must decide.  If it 
does not, then neither the Rule nor REA has any application.  If it does, 
there are two ways to ask the questions necessary to give meaning to 
“substantive right” in REA.216  They are similar, but they differ slightly 
in the breadth of insulation from displacement that they offer to state 
law.  I do not intend to suggest that either approach would do away with 
difficult cases under REA (although the first approach set out below 
 
 211. Redish & Murashko, supra note 35, at 31. 
 212. Id. at 33. 
 213. Id. at 32-33. 
 214. Id. at 62.  See supra text accompanying note 187. 
 215. Id. at 58-61. 
 216. This suggestion only applies to cases where the applicability (and hence the legitimacy) of 
a Federal Rule promulgated under the authority of REA is at issue.  It has no application to cases 
that RDA governs, such as Erie, Guaranty Trust and Byrd. 
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might tend to because of its rigidity).  The Justices’ current approaches, 
however, resolve nothing on the basis of any clear rationale. 
Perhaps the Court has been so hesitant because it is highly averse to 
creating an approach or a rule that will give a “bad” result in some cases.  
Both separation of powers and federalism are sensitive issues in our 
legal culture, and the advantage in not having an identifiable approach 
lies in the Court’s ability to reach the “right” result in each individual 
case.217  The Court’s caution is understandable but unrealistic.  It is 
difficult to think of any legal rule, substantive or procedural, that does 
not on occasion produce results with which  the decision-maker or 
society more generally are uncomfortable.  When those decisions occur 
with unacceptable frequency, the law changes, whether by legislative 
enactment, administrative rule-making or common law development.  
That is the process that the Anglo-American legal systems have followed 
for close to a millennium.  Whether we are aware of it or not, the 
standard we actually use in judging the utility of a particular rule is 
whether it works well most of the time.  Otherwise the legal system ends 
up caught between the Scylla of constant ad hoc adjudication that defies 
prediction by bench or bar and the Charybdis of wholly procrustean 
rules.  Predictability is a value in our system, albeit certainly not the only 
one.  The Court’s REA jurisprudence has yielded only unpredictability, 
of which Shady Grove is only the most recent example.  I propose, 
therefore, that we need some predictability in REA cases, and I see two 
possibilities for working rules that might help produce it. 
First, the courts might ask whether the state law and Federal Rule at 
issue tend to establish or negate an element of the claimant’s cause of 
action or a defense on the merits.  If the state law does not, then it is 
procedural, but that is not the end of the inquiry.  One must still ask 
whether the Federal Rule does tend to establish or negate an element.  If 
so, it trenches upon REA-forbidden territory; otherwise it is 
“procedural” for REA purposes and can apply.  Courts seem to have had 
far less trouble agreeing on what goes to the merits than on what 
constitutes substance versus procedure. I shall refer to this as the 
elements approach.  It is the narrower of the two possible approaches.  It 
has two advantages.  It focuses attention on how people order their 
conduct on a day-to-day basis, not on how they litigate once a claim has 
arisen.  The second advantage is that it is far easier to apply and far less 
 
 217. I set to one side Justice Jackson’s observation that whatever the Court does is “right” by 
definition.  See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (“We are not final because we are 
infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.”).  It is true, but not analytically useful. 
39
Doernberg: "The Tempest"
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2011
12-DOERNBERG_44.4_8.7.11_DONE-9.2.11.DOC 9/12/2011  8:46 AM 
1186 AKRON LAW REVIEW [44:1147 
amorphous than the Court’s current approach—even if one can say at 
this point that the Court has a current approach.  There is a significant 
disadvantage, however.  Focusing narrowly on the elements of the claim 
or of a defense on the merits subordinates rules intended to govern day-
to-day behavior that are nonetheless not elements of any cause of action.  
As Justices Stevens and Ginsburg pointed out in Shady Grove, rules that 
ostensibly regulate procedure may have true non-procedural goals.218  A 
procedural rule may exist to regulate non-litigation conduct, as Professor 
Ely suggested.219 
It may be better, therefore, to ask whether, before the litigation 
began and assuming the parties were fully aware of the competing rules, 
they would rationally have ordered their conduct in accord with one of 
the rules.  Alternately stated, does the rule exist to govern conduct 
outside of the courthouse and before commencement of litigation?  I 
shall refer to this as the behavioral approach.  It is somewhat broader 
than Justice Harlan’s primary-conduct approach in his Hanna 
concurrence,220 because the behavioral approach would consider the 
decision of whether or not to sue to be antecedent to the litigation 
process itself, whereas it seems unlikely that Justice Harlan would have 
regarded that decision as substantive within the meaning of REA.  In 
some cases—not many, I think—one would classify a rule as procedural 
under the elements approach but substantive under the behavioral 
approach.  Given the cloudiness of Congress’s “any substantive right” 
language and the sensitivity of separation-of-powers and federalism 
issues, caution may counsel the Federal Rule to yield. 
In Shady Grove, both approaches yield the same result.  Under the 
elements approach, one would look at the choice-of-law issue—whether 
to certify a plaintiff class—and ask whether the availability of the class 
action device goes to any of the elements of the penalty claim or a 
defense on the merits.  The elements of the penalty claim are simple:  a 
properly documented claim and payment more than thirty days 
thereafter.  Available defenses on the merits appear to include timely 
payment or that the plaintiff did not properly document the claim.  
Whether there can be a class action or not on behalf of similarly situated 
 
 218. Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1453 
(2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 1463 n.2, 1465 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 219. See Ely, supra note 9, at 727-28.  See also infra notes 239-44, 245-52 and accompanying 
text.  One apparent example of that arose in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 
541 (1949).  See infra notes 239-244 and accompanying text. 
 220. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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claimants does not go to the elements of a claim or merits defense.  A 
class action, after all, is not itself a cause of action; it is a consolidation 
device for claims that may sound in torts, contracts, property or under a 
statute.  Under the elements approach, the Court reached the correct 
result. 
Let us consider the behavioral approach.  Assuming arguendo that 
Allstate had an established practice of paying claims late, one should ask 
whether the underlying legislative purpose of section 901(b) was to 
enable late payment of claims—telling insurers, in effect, that they could 
ignore New York’s statutory prompt-payment obligation with relative 
impunity.  That seems unlikely, since the legislature would have been 
undermining one of its own statutes.221  It would, in effect, have been 
authorizing violations of the law.  It is far more likely that the statute, 
rather than intending to regulate behavior, sought merely to limit one of 
the devices otherwise available to seek redress for bad behavior.  If 
section 901(b) is not directed at regulating behavior—providing 
incentive either to undertake or to refrain from undertaking some 
action—then it is not substantive within the meaning of the behavioral 
approach, and the Shady Grove Court reached the correct result. 
Examining some of the Court’s vertical choice-of-law cases from 
the perspectives I posit produces interesting results.222  Sibbach involved 
a personal privacy223 right that conflicted with Rule 35.  Nonetheless, 
the five-to-four majority ruled that Rule 35 applied, rejecting the 
defendant’s broad reading of “substantive” in REA: 
   We are thrown back, then, to the arguments drawn from the 
language of the Act of June 19, 1934.  Is the phrase “substantive 
rights” confined to rights conferred by law to be protected and 
enforced in accordance with the adjective law of judicial procedure?  It 
certainly embraces such rights.  One of them is the right not to be 
injured in one's person by another’s negligence, to redress infraction of 
 
 221. One might hypothesize that this is exactly what the legislature intended because of purely 
political reasons.  Perhaps the legislature wanted to look like it was doing something for consumers 
while not significantly affecting the corporate base from which many political candidates draw 
considerable funding.  There is no evidence of that, which of course may mean nothing more than 
that the legislature accomplished its purpose well, but I am not so much of a cynic as to give such a 
presumption weight in the legal balance.  But see supra note 75. 
 222. Bear in mind that REA’s prohibition addresses only federal rules that REA authorizes, 
presently consisting of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, and the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Hanna made quite clear that its approach with 
respect to the Federal Rules applied only to those created under the authorization of REA; in all 
other cases, one must deal with what Chief Justice Warren called the “relatively unguided Erie 
Choice. . . .”  Hanna, 380 U.S.at 471.   
 223. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.   
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which the present action was brought.  The petitioner says the phrase 
connotes more; that by its use Congress intended that in regulating 
procedure this court should not deal with important and substantial 
rights theretofore recognized.  Recognized where and by whom? . . .   
   The asserted right, moreover, is no more important than many 
others enjoyed by litigants in District Courts sitting in the several 
states, before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure altered and 
abolished old rights or privileges and created new ones in connection 
with the conduct of litigation.  The suggestion that the rule offends the 
important right to freedom from invasion of the person ignores the fact 
that as we hold, no invasion of freedom from personal restraint 
attaches to refusal so to comply with its provisions.  If we were to 
adopt the suggested criterion of the importance of the alleged right we 
should invite endless litigation and confusion worse confounded. The 
test must be whether a rule really regulates procedure,—the judicial 
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law 
and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or 
infraction of them.224 
The majority connoted that REA’s limiting language referred only 
to the substantive rights and duties directly involved in the plaintiff’s 
claim and defenses on the merits.  The four dissenting Justices argued 
that personal privacy was special and Rule 35’s contrary provision 
should have been a matter of legislation, not rule-making by the 
Supreme Court.225 
Under the elements approach, Sibbach presents no problem.  The 
right not to be subject to a court-ordered physical examination is no part 
of the plaintiff’s claim or a defense on the merits.  Wilson sued for 
personal injuries.226  The elements of her tort claim were defendant’s 
duty of care, breach of duty, injury and causal connection between 
breach and injury.  The state-law entitlement to avoid a physical 
examination227 does not address any element of her claim.  Wilson had 
no obligation to establish such an entitlement as part of her case-in-chief, 
nor would Sibbach’s demonstrating its absence tend to establish any 
defense.  The elements approach supports the Sibbach result. 
The behavioral approach yields the same result, though by looking 
at the events antecedent to the litigation rather than the elements of 
claims and defenses.  The action for damages arose out of an automobile 
 
 224. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1941). 
 225. See id. at 17-18 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 226. Id. at 6. 
 227. Id. at 7 & n.3. 
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accident.228  How likely is it that Wilson’s agent drove as he did because 
he or the company thought it could use Rule 35 to avoid the Illinois law?  
Assume for the sake of discussion that the accident occurred when the 
Wilson & Co. vehicle struck Sibbach, a pedestrian, while she was 
crossing the street.  Is it likely that Sibbach decided to cross in front of 
the oncoming vehicle rather than after it passed because she knew that 
Illinois law shielded her from being ordered to undergo a physical 
examination?  The mind reels at the suggestion.229  It is absurd to 
believe that either party ordered its conduct in light of the Illinois 
privilege.  Assuming that the parties even knew of the Illinois privilege, 
it not something that would have caused either of them to act or refrain 
from acting in a particular way—nor is it conceivable that the rule-
maker had such a purpose in mind when creating the rule.  The Sibbach 
majority was correct that Rule 35 was not substantive for REA 
purposes.230 
The Court’s next encounter with the applicability of the Federal 
Rules came in the 1949 trio.231  In Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & 
Warehouse Co., the issue was whether state law, which provided that 
service of process stopped the running of the statute of limitations, or 
Federal Rule 3, which made filing the complaint the commencement of 
an action, governed whether the action was timely.232  Rule 3, then as 
now, said nothing about stopping a limitations period.233  The Court 
ruled that state law governed because the choice between federal and 
 
 228. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 108 F.2d 415, 415 (7th Cir. 1939), rev’d, 312 U.S. 1 (1941). 
 229. The actual situation makes the suggestion even more absurd.  The accident occurred in 
Indiana, yet the dispute was over whether the Illinois privilege governed.  Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 7.  
In the 1930’s the prevailing choice-of-law rule was lex loci delicti (the law of the place of the 
wrongs).  PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS & SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CONFLICT OF LAWS 794-
95 (5th ed. 2010).  The reader may well ask why the parties would have referred to the law of 
Illinois at all.  The answer is that the action was in the Illinois federal court, and under the conflicts 
regime of the time, the forum would apply the substantive law of the place where the accident 
occurred but would apply its own procedural law.  Illinois law was involved precisely because it 
was procedural for horizontal choice-of-law purposes.  How likely is it that the parties had that in 
mind when they acted in Indiana?  Even if their attorneys were well versed in the complexities of 
conflict of laws, it is doubtful that such considerations would have entered their thinking if they had 
known that their clients planned to drive in Indiana. 
 230. The majority reversed the district court’s order holding Wilson in contempt for her refusal 
to submit to examination.  Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 16.  It did so only because Rule 35’s text explicitly 
excluded contempt as a sanction. Id.  Had Rule 37 not contained that limitation, the contempt 
citation would have been justified.  Rule 37 was not substantive under the test of the time, and the 
majority opinion is clear that only Rule 37’s internal limitation prevented the citation.  Id.  Notably, 
the Court did not rule out any other sanction under Rule 37. 
 231. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 232. 337 U.S. 530 (1949). 
 233. See MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 3.01, at 3-5 (2011); FED. R. CIV. P. 3. 
43
Doernberg: "The Tempest"
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2011
12-DOERNBERG_44.4_8.7.11_DONE-9.2.11.DOC 9/12/2011  8:46 AM 
1190 AKRON LAW REVIEW [44:1147 
state law was outcome-determinative.234  When the Court revisited the 
issue in Walker v. Armco Steel. Co. thirty-one years later, it used 
Hanna’s approach and relied on the Rule's silence to find that there was 
no direct conflict.235  The result was the same though the method of 
reaching it differed. 
The elements approach is consistent with Walker for the reason 
upon which Walker relied.  Rule 3 does not speak directly to the 
question of the event that stops a state statute of limitations from 
running,236 thus falling outside of Hanna’s direct collision requirement.  
Neither the Rule nor REA has anything to say about the case, and 
therefore, one comes back to Byrd balancing, at which point the 
elements approach does not apply.237  Under RDA, the appropriate 
question is whether some dominant federal interest requires stopping the 
statute of limitations for a state-created claim on the date of filing rather 
than the date of service.  Neither Congress nor the courts have ever 
suggested that there is.  The state rule governs by default.238 
The behavioral approach reaches that result but reasons differently.  
The service rule that state law established supported no interest in how 
the parties conducted themselves in the events leading up to the accrual 
of the cause of action and the decision to commence a lawsuit.  Ragan 
was an automobile accident case.  Whatever the purposes of service-of-
process rules and statutes of limitations are, no one has ever suggested 
that they exist to control how people drive or whether they decide to sue 
following an accident.  Rather, they exist to control how people litigate. 
In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,239 the issue was 
whether the plaintiff in a shareholder’s derivative action had to post a 
bond for defense expenses, which state law required.  Federal Rule 23240 
imposed no such requirement.  Applying Guaranty Trust, the Court 
ruled that the state law governed, reasoning that it created a new 
substantive liability for the plaintiff and that Erie’s policy of achieving 
 
 234. Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 532-33 (1949). 
 235. 446 U.S. 740 (1980). 
 236. The Rule does, however, control with respect to federal limitations periods.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Wahl, 583 F.2d 285, 289 (6th Cir. 1978) (holding that Rule 3 governs federal 
limitations periods, relying in part on 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) (statute of limitations specifying filing as 
the critical date)).  The Supreme Court strongly implied this in Walker v. Armco Steel Co., 446 U.S. 
740, 750-51 (1980) (“There is no indication that the Rule was intended to toll a state statute of 
limitations.” (emphasis added)). 
 237. See supra note 222. 
 238. See Doernberg, supra note 11, at 645. 
 239. 337 U.S. 541 (1949). 
 240. Rule 23 then governed derivative actions.  See Cohen, 337 U.S. at 556.  Today FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23.1 governs; the requirements are unchanged. 
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the same substantive results in diversity litigation as in state litigation 
mandated applying the state rule.241 
  The Court has not faced that question again, so one can only 
speculate how Hanna’s approach would have decided the case.  The 
Hanna Court might have reached the same result as Cohen because Rule 
23.1 does not mention bonds.  Thus, the Court might have found the 
Rule inapplicable.242  On the other hand, it might have concluded that 
Rule 23.1 sets out the exclusive list of conditions for maintaining a 
derivative action in the federal courts and that the state was attempting to 
modify the Rule.243  Either approach has some traction. 
The elements approach would regard the bond requirement as 
procedural because it does not go to any element of the shareholder’s 
claim against the corporate fiduciaries, nor is it part of any defense on 
the merits that they might offer.  Thus under the elements approach, 
there is no REA problem; the remaining (but really preliminary) 
question is whether Rule 23.1 really does address the issue.  That, 
however, is a question about the Rule’s scope, not its legitimacy. 
For the behavioral approach, Cohen presents a difficult problem.  
One doubts the state legislature enacted the bond requirement to 
encourage or facilitate mismanagement by corporate fiduciaries.  It is a 
veritable certainty that the corporate fiduciaries did not undertake their 
actions (whatever they were and whether or not they were unlawful) in 
reliance on the law requiring a shareholder to post a bond in a derivative 
suit.  On the other hand, it is not hard to see the purpose of the 
requirement as an attempt to regulate shareholders’ behavior by 
discouraging groundless actions undertaken in order to extort settlements 
not supported by the merits and benefiting only the individual plaintiff 
and counsel.244  Thus viewed, the rule intends to discourage the decision 
to commence litigation for the wrong reasons.  In that sense, it intends to 
 
 241. See Cohen, 337 U.S. at 556.   But as in Ragan, it was less than clear that there was 
unavoidable conflict between the state and federal rules, although Justice Scalia’s Shady Grove 
approach might have found one on the ground that Rule 23.1’s listing of the requirements for 
maintaining such an action excludes by clear implication a court-ordered bond. 
 242. Cf. Walker v. Armco Steel Co., 446 U.S. 740 (1980) (holding Rule 3’s non-mention of 
statutes of limitation meant state rule governed). 
 243. This was Justice Scalia’s approach to Rule 23 in Shady Grove.  See supra notes 76-78 and 
accompanying text. 
 244. See Ely, supra note 9, at 729.  The statute (Chapter 131, New Jersey Laws of 1945, 
N.J.S.A. 14:3-15 to 17 (current version at N.J.S.A. 14A:3-6(3) (2006))) actually aimed more 
broadly.  It penalized any unsuccessful plaintiff whose holdings in the company were less than five 
percent and did not exceed $50,000 in value, not merely one whom the court determined not to have 
had reasonable grounds for bringing the action.  See Cohen, 337 U.S. at 543.  (Apparently 
shareholders with greater holdings could bring meritless actions without such official disapproval.) 
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control behavior antecedent to the commencement and conduct of the 
litigation itself, so the behavioral approach would not apply Rule 17.  
This is one example of the elements approach and the behavioral 
approach differing in outcome.  Cohen also exemplifies a rule that is 
procedural in form but has a substantive, extra-litigation purpose.   
The final case, Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.,245 involved a direct 
collision between an explicit Federal Rule and state law.  Mississippi 
law246 required foreign corporations doing business in the state to 
designate an in-state agent for service of process and barred non-
compliant corporations from being plaintiffs in any state court.247  The 
Supreme Court held that the state law governed, basing its decision 
explicitly on Guaranty Trust despite Federal Rule 17’s unambiguous 
declaration that the law of a corporation’s home state governed its 
capacity to sue.248   
The York case was premised on the theory that a right which local law 
creates but which it does not supply with a remedy is no right at all for 
purposes of enforcement in a federal court in a diversity case; that 
where in such cases one is barred from recovery in the state court, he 
should likewise be barred in the federal court.  The contrary result 
would create discriminations against citizens of the State in favor of 
those authorized to invoke the diversity jurisdiction of the federal 
courts.  It was that element of discrimination that Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins was designed to eliminate.249 
 
 245. 337 U.S. 535 (1949). 
 246. MISS. CODE 1942, § 5319. 
 247. Woods argued that Mississippi law voided the contract.  The Fifth Circuit declined that 
interpretation, Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 168 F.2d 701 (1948), rev’d on other grounds, 337 
U.S. 535 (1949), and ruled that Mississippi could not control the access of a litigant to the federal 
courts. 
 248. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b) (“Capacity to sue or be sued is determined as follows:  . . . (2) for a 
corporation, by the law under which it was organized.”). 
 249. Woods, 337 U.S. at 538.  The Court relied on its earlier decision in Angel v. Bullington, 
330 U.S. 183 (1947), involving the same point but with a different state’s law. 
  The Court conflated two matters it should have considered separately.  When the Court 
referred to the plaintiff as being “barred from recovery in the state court,” Woods, 337 U.S. at 538, it 
should have distinguished between whether or not the bar went to the elements of the case.  Inability 
to plead or prove one or more elements of the cause of action may bar recovery.  Inability to pay the 
state’s filing fee may also bar recovery.  The first is substantive; the second clearly is not.  If the 
state’s filing fee were higher than the federal, would even the Woods Court have declared it 
outcome-determinative and used the state rule?  Certainly the Hanna Court would not have.  This 
exemplifies the persistent problem with the outcome-determinative test:  it asks whether a particular 
rule is outcome-determinative, but it does not ask why.  To decide whether a Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure is within REA, that question is essential. 
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When the Court decided Interstate Realty, however, Hanna v. 
Plumer’s approach to conflicts involving a Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure was not in place.  Under Hanna, the Court might come out the 
other way.  It would be disingenuous to read Rule 17 not to address the 
question of capacity to sue.250  Then the issue would be whether the 
Rule violated REA.   Hanna’s approach was to ask whether the rule 
“really regulates procedure,” borrowing from Sibbach.251  The Court 
might decide that regulating access to the courts is procedural, or, as 
Professor Ely argued,252 it might read the Mississippi rule to address the 
substantive goal of encouraging out-of-state corporations doing business 
there to register and find that as applied, Rule 17 violated REA’s 
substantive-rights limitation. 
The elements approach would clearly have Interstate Realty come 
out differently from its actual result.  Interstate Realty's claim sounded in 
contract to recover a broker’s commission on a real estate transaction.253  
The elements of the contract claim are familiar to all, and they do not 
include capacity to sue.  Rule 17 would therefore be legitimate under 
REA using the elements approach. 
The behavioral approach would probably reach the opposite result.  
It would depend on whether Mississippi wanted the state rule as a means 
of controlling the conduct of litigation, in which case it would not affect 
extra-litigation behavior or, as Professor Ely suggested, it was serving 
the substantive purpose of having foreign corporations doing business in 
Mississippi register and pay required state fees.  If Professor Ely’s 
surmise was correct, then the behavioral approach would reject Rule 
17’s application and diverge from the elements approach. 
Since Hanna, the Court has decided only a few cases involving the 
applicability of a Federal Rule.  Generally, the Court has read the Rule 
not to reach the critical issue with sufficient explicitness to qualify under 
Hanna’s direct-collision standard.  The first such case was Walker v. 
Armco Steel Co., involving Rule 3 and its effect on statutes of 
limitations, and the Court read Rule 3 not to reach the question.254  The 
elements and behavioral approaches lead to the same result for the same 
reason. 
 
 250. See supra note 216. 
 251. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464 (1965) (quoting Sibbach & Co. v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 
1, 14 (1941)). 
 252. See Ely, supra note 9, at 728. 
 253. Woods, 337 U.S. at 535-36. 
 254. Walker v. Armco Steel Co., 446 U.S. 740 (1980).  See supra notes 113-16 and 
accompanying text. 
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The second was Semtek International Incorporated v. Lockheed 
Martin Corporation.255  Semtek asked whether state or federal law 
governed the preclusive effect of a federal judgment dismissing a 
diversity case on state statute-of-limitations grounds.256  The Court 
considered the effect of Rule 41(b), which stated in pertinent part that 
“Unless the dismissal order states otherwise . . . any dismissal not under 
this rule—except one for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or failure 
to join a party under Rule 19—operates as an adjudication on the 
merits.”257  Semtek had brought a diversity action in a California federal 
court seeking damages for breach of contract and business torts.258  The 
district court dismissed on the basis of California’s statute of 
limitations,259 and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.260 
Semtek then sued on the same claims in Maryland state court.261  
Maryland had a longer limitations period, and Lockheed, a citizen of 
Maryland, could not remove.262  Instead, it sought dismissal on the 
ground of claim preclusion.  The Maryland court granted the motion, 
reasoning that federal law governed the preclusive effect of a federal 
judgment and that Rule 41(b) made the limitations dismissal “an 
adjudication on the merits.”263  No one raised an REA question.  A 
unanimous Court held that Maryland was correct about federal law 
governing264 but incorrect in its reading of Rule 41(b).265  Justice Scalia, 
writing for the Court, declined to read “on the merits” to have preclusive 
effect.266  In his view,  “The original connotation of an ‘on the merits’ 
adjudication is one that actually ‘pass[es] directly on the substance of [a] 
claim’ before the court.”267  Justice Scalia concluded that the phrase in 
 
 255. 531 U.S. 497 (2001).   
 256. Id. at 499. 
 257. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b). 
 258. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 499. 
 259. The district court was quite explicit, dismissing Semtek’s claims “ ‘in [their] entirety on 
the merits and with prejudice.’”  Id. at 499 (quoting the district court’s order of dismissal).   
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. 
 262. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2006). 
 263. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b); Semtek, 531 U.S. at 500.  Claim preclusion requires dismissal when 
there is a valid, final judgment on the merits.  See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 
322, 326 n.5 (1979); JACK FRIEDENTHAL, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, supra note 27, 
§ 14.4, at 619-20.   
 264. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 507. 
 265. Id. at 509. 
 266. Id. at 505-06. 
 267. Id. at 501 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 19, cmt. a, at 161) (1982)).   
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Rule 41(b) did not refer to the preclusive effect of a dismissal,268 so that 
the Federal Rule did not apply by its terms.  That was the end of the 
discussion of the Federal Rule.269 
 
 268. Id. at 503 (“Rule 41(b) sets forth nothing more than a default rule for determining the 
import of a dismissal (a dismissal is ‘upon the merits,’ with the three stated exceptions, unless the 
court ‘otherwise specifies’).  This would be a highly peculiar context in which to announce a 
federally prescribed rule on the complex question of claim preclusion, saying in effect, ‘All federal 
dismissals (with three specified exceptions) preclude suit elsewhere, unless the court otherwise 
specifies.’  And even apart from the purely default character of Rule 41(b), it would be peculiar to 
find a rule governing the effect that must be accorded federal judgments by other courts ensconced 
in rules governing the internal procedures of the rendering court itself.  Indeed, such a rule would 
arguably violate the jurisdictional limitation of the Rules Enabling Act:  that the Rules ‘shall not 
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. . . .’” (citations omitted)). 
  This parallels the Walker Court’s approach.  See supra note 116 and accompanying text.   
The interpretive method Justice Scalia employed in Semtek may seem at odds with his general 
disdain for divining the intent of the drafters of legislation.  He was notably skeptical of Justice 
White’s attempt to piece together Congress’s intent underlying two statutes in Pennsylvania v. 
Union Gas Co.: 
That methodology is appropriate, and Justice White’s conclusion is perhaps correct, if 
one assumes that the task of a court of law is to plumb the intent of the particular 
Congress that enacted a particular provision.  That methodology is not mine nor, I think, 
the one that courts have traditionally followed.  It is our task, as I see it, not to enter the 
minds of the Members of Congress—who need have nothing in mind in order for their 
votes to be both lawful and effective—but rather to give fair and reasonable meaning to 
the text of the United States Code, adopted by various Congresses at various times.  
491 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  That approach is 
why scholars refer to Justice Scalia as a textualist.  See, e.g., Bernard W. Bell, R-E-S-P-E-C-T 
Respecting Legislative Judgments in Interpretive Theory, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1253, 1277 (2000) 
(characterizing Justice Scalia as “perhaps the premier new textualist”).  But then, Justice Scalia does 
as well, and he embraces the appellation.  See Scalia, supra note 14, at 23-24.  It is important, 
however, to understand that Justice Scalia does not espouse a purely mechanical reading of statutory 
and constitutional text.  He recognizes that every enacted law has a purpose, but he thinks courts 
should determine that purpose from the words of the provision and the context in which it became 
law rather than isolated comments—or even committee reports—from legislators who supported or 
opposed passage.  See generally, Scalia, supra note 14. 
 269. Justice Scalia noted that if Rule 41(b) had the effect that Lockheed urged, there might 
have been an REA problem.  Semtek, 531 U.S. at 503. 
  There being no dispositive Federal Rule, the Court asked whether state or federal law 
should govern—the “relatively unguided Erie choice.”  Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).  
Because the question involved the preclusive effect of a federal judgment, the Court held that 
federal common law should govern—hardly a shocking conclusion.  (In my terms, the Court found 
that the federal interest in controlling the preclusive effect of federal judgments was dominant.  The 
Byrd balance thus tipped to the federal side.)  That left the question of finding content for the federal 
common law.  Using a straightforward interest-balancing approach, Justice Scalia concluded that 
there was no need for a uniform federal rule.  Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508  This distinguished Semtek 
from Byrd, see supra notes 43-45, 78 and accompanying text, in which the Court had found a 
dominant federal interest sufficient to displace the state rule that otherwise would have governed.  
In Semtek, “there is no conceivable federal interest in giving that [California] time bar more effect in 
other courts than the California courts themselves would impose.”  Semtek, 531 U.S. at 509.  He 
noted further that creating a new rule rather than using the state rule would simultaneously create 
the kind of incentive for parties to forum-shop that Erie and Hanna condemned.  Id. at 508-09.  
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The elements approach would reach the same result.  Given the 
Court’s reading of Rule 41(b) not to address preclusion at all, there can 
be no REA problem, so one never need ask whether preclusion is an 
element of a claim or a defense on the merits.  If the Court had read Rule 
41(b) to address preclusion, then the elements approach would follow 
what the Court found to be the dictates of the Rule, because preclusion is 
not an element of any claim or any defense on the merits.270 
The behavioral approach would agree with the elements approach.  
Given that the Federal Rule does not reach the issue, there is nothing 
further to analyze.  If the Court had read the Rule to prescribe the 
applicable test for preclusion, then the behavioral approach would apply 
it because the rules of claim preclusion address intra-litigation conduct 
only, being designed to encourage consolidation of all claims from a 
single incident into a single action.  This might differ from the result the 
Hanna Court might reach because preclusion so often controls 
disposition of the case because of its effect on adjudication of the merits.  
Moreover, one might regard the rules of claim preclusion as having the 
same kind of dual purpose as do statutes of limitations, first to make 
litigation more timely and efficient, but second to provide repose to the 
defendant.  Thus, whether preclusion rules “really regulate[ ] procedure” 
or have only an “incidental” effect on substantive rights is a matter for 
guesswork and argument.  That is one of the problems Hanna 
bequeathed. 
Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.271 involved a Federal 
Rule, but not an REA problem.  The case presented a collision between a 
state rule and the Seventh Amendment.272  The Supremacy Clause273 
dictates the result of that clash:  federal law prevails.  Justice Ginsburg 
then examined, in service of Erie’s same-outcome policy,274 whether it 
 
Accordingly, the Court adopted California law as the content of the federal common law rule in this 
case and remanded to the Maryland courts for determination of the California rule of preclusion.  Id. 
at 509. 
 270. To be sure, its application may decide a claim.  But that is true of virtually any procedural 
rule.  The fact that it may be dispositive (or, in Guaranty Trust’s terms, outcome-determinative) 
does not transform it into an element of claims for business torts or breach of contract. 
 271. 518 U.S. 415 (1996). 
 272. See supra notes 119-24, 164-69 and accompanying text. 
 273. U.S. CONST. art VI, § 2. 
 274. In writing Guaranty Trust, Justice Frankfurter referred several times to Erie’s “policy.”  
See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101 (1945) (“Our starting point must be the 
policy of federal jurisdiction which Erie . . . embodies.”); Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 109 (“The 
nub of the policy  that underlies Erie . . . is that for the same transaction the accident of a suit by a 
non-resident litigant in a federal court instead of in a State court a block away, should not lead to a 
substantially different result.”).  The reference to policy was necessary, because Erie purported to 
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would be possible for the federal courts to accommodate the substantive 
part of the New York rule (the limitation of damages) while ignoring the 
procedural part that created the Seventh Amendment conflict.275  The 
Court decided that Rule 59’s new-trial power offered the judicial 
determination of unreasonableness that New York sought without 
running afoul of the Seventh Amendment’s276 prohibition of judicial re-
examination of facts determined by a jury.277 
The Gasperini majority apparently did not perceive any REA 
problem, since there is no significant mention of REA in the opinion.  
Justice Scalia also did not think there was an REA problem, because he 
saw the matter as entirely procedural, not substantive, within the 
meaning of REA.278  His dissent rested on Seventh Amendment 
grounds.279  Therefore Gasperini is not a true REA case.  REA cases 
concern themselves with situations where someone argues that a Federal 
Rule overreaches—treads on the substantive area that REA removes 
from Federal Rules competence.  Gasperini did not involve that sort of 
problem.  Justice Scalia did think there was federal overreaching in the 
case, but he laid it at the feet of the Courts of Appeals and the Gasperini 
majority for what he saw as their infidelity to common law history.280  
He had no quarrel with Rule 59 itself. 
The elements approach would reach the result the Court reached.  
The New York materially-deviates standard goes to an element of the 
case—it operates as a cap on a defendant’s total exposure to damages, 
albeit a vague one.281  One might regard it as an element of the 
plaintiff’s claim, though I think it is better to regard it as an element of a 
defense on the merits.  Legislatures or the common law prescribe what is 
compensable.  Gasperini’s state-law claims sounded in contract and in 
 
rest on constitutional grounds, and the decision in Guaranty Trust could not; Congress clearly has 
the power to prescribe statutes of limitations for actions brought in the federal courts.  See supra 
note 156. 
 275. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 431-38. 
 276. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall 
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact, tried by jury, shall be 
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common 
law.”).   
 277. Justice Scalia dissented on this point.  He viewed Rule 59 as enshrining the federal 
“seriously erroneous result” standard, Gasperini, 531 U.S. at 468 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation 
omitted), fatally in conflict with the New York reasonableness standard, which he also characterized 
as procedural.  Id. at 464  Thus, he thought it would be error for a district court to use the New York 
standard. 
 278. Id. at 437-38. 
 279. See id. at 450-61.  
 280. Id. at 451-58.  
 281. See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text. 
51
Doernberg: "The Tempest"
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2011
12-DOERNBERG_44.4_8.7.11_DONE-9.2.11.DOC 9/12/2011  8:46 AM 
1198 AKRON LAW REVIEW [44:1147 
tort (conversion and negligence).  The New York legislature had 
established a recovery limit,282 and Gasperini said that it must apply.  
The statutorily imposed limit on damages is an element of a defense on 
the merits, because the legislature made it so.  Thus, under the elements 
approach it is substantive for Erie and REA purposes.283 
The problem then is how to apply the New York damages 
limitation without violating the Seventh Amendment.  Rule 59 is 
available for that purpose.  Federal trial judges have always had the 
power to order new trials if the verdict is against the weight of the 
evidence.284  The reasonableness of a damages award is another 
application of the weight-of-the-evidence standard.  For a trial judge to 
find that the damages are excessive or insufficient, she need only decide 
that the evidence does not support damages in the amount the jury 
awarded.  It is at least questionable, however, whether she can grant 
remittitur directly.  The Supreme Court has not held either that remittitur 
is or is not constitutional.285  It appears, however, to have accepted the 
use of the conditional new-trial device under Rule 59 for that purpose.286   
 
 282. No one seems to doubt that a legislature can place an absolute cap on damages.  The 
Gasperini parties accepted that.  See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 428-29.  Justice Stevens spoke of such 
caps as being without Seventh Amendment problems and went further, endorsing New York’s 
definition “in less mathematical terms” as “not requir[ing] a different constitutional conclusion.”  Id. 
at 442 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Justice Scalia appeared tacitly to accept the legitimacy of absolute 
legislative monetary caps, but argued that New York’s limitation was a standard of judicial review 
rather than a substantive rule of law.  Id. at 464-65 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 283. There is another Federal Rule that no Justice mentioned that supports the majority’s 
approach.  FED. R. CIV. P. 54(c) provides that a judgment other than a default judgment “should 
grant the relief to which each party is entitled, even if the party has not demanded that relief in its 
pleadings.”  It is law, not fact, that establishes a party’s entitlement to relief within the meaning of 
the Rule.  If that were not so, fixed statutory caps on damages, which the Court allows, would be of 
no effect if a jury decided to ignore them. 
 284. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 95, at 
680 (6th ed. 2002) (noting excessiveness of damages as one of the “usual grounds” for grant of new 
trial).  See generally 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2807, at 78-86 (1995). 
 285. In Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935), the Court found additur unconstitutional 
because it was unknown to the common law.  “[T]he established practice and the rule of the 
common law, as it existed in England at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, forbade the 
court to increase the amount of damages awarded by a jury in actions such as that here under 
consideration.”  Id. at 482.  Thus, insufficiency of damages was not a ground upon which a federal 
trial court could order a new trial (even conditionally to allow the losing party to stipulate to the 
entry of judgment in a higher amount).  (Interestingly, the Court rested its decision on the plaintiff’s 
entitlement to a jury trial, not on the defendant’s.  See id. at 486-87.) 
  In dictum, the Court cast doubt on the legitimacy of remittitur, but noted remittitur’s long 
history of acceptance in the federal courts and acceded to it.  Id. at 482-85.  The Court also implied 
that it would decline to reconsider the matter.  Id. at 485. 
[I]t therefore may be that, if the question of remittitur were now before us for the first 
time, it would be decided otherwise.  But, first  announced by Mr. Justice Story in 1822, 
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Under the behavioral approach, New York’s limit is conduct-
regulating in the extra-litigation sense.  The potential loss that an actor 
faces for running afoul of the law defines, at least in part, society’s 
judgment about the degree of care the actor should exercise to avoid the 
loss.  Judge Learned Hand’s famous “formula” from United States v. 
Carroll Towing Co.287 demonstrates that.  In his terms, if the economic 
burden of taking precautions against harm is less than the risked harm 
multiplied by the probability of its occurring, the law of negligence 
demands that the actor undertake the burden.  There is nothing so 
surprising about this; it mirrors the calculus that every rational person 
undertakes before acting.288  The New York reasonable-damages 
standard limits size of the risked injury and therefore simultaneously 
limits the precautions that the wise actor will take. 
C. “The Road Not Taken,” with Thanks to Robert Frost289 
Despite their differences about the result in Shady Grove, the 
Justices are unanimous about the process in which they engage to find an 
answer.  All are balancing state and federal interests, which is actually 
 
the doctrine has been accepted as the law for more than a hundred years and uniformly 
applied in the federal courts during that time.  And, as it finds some support in the 
practice of the English courts prior to the adoption of the Constitution, we may assume 
that in a case involving a remittitur, which this case does not, the doctrine would not be 
reconsidered or disturbed at this late day. 
Id. at 484-85. 
 286. See WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 284, § 2815, at 160-63. 
  If one reads Rule 59 not to apply, the issue then devolves to an application of RDA, not 
REA, with respect to the grant of a new trial.  In other words, is it permissible for the federal courts 
to create federal common law to govern the situation?  I suggest that it is, and the dominant federal 
interest is serving “the twin aim of Erie” (see supra note 135):  avoiding forum-shopping that 
results in inequitable administration of the law. 
 287. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).  Judge Hand expressed himself in algebraic terms:  “[I]f the 
probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less 
than L multiplied by P. . . .”  Id. at 173. 
 288. The example I use when teaching is familiar to every law student and lawyer.  The weary 
law student, facing extended preparation for the next day’s class, must make a choice of whether to 
prepare or to get desperately needed sleep.  It requires no extrasensory perception to know that she 
makes the decision after evaluating the likelihood of being called on to recite (probability), the 
penalty imposed (e.g., reduction in grade or temporary embarrassment) if the professor does call on 
an unprepared student (injury), and how much the student needs the extra sleep (the burden of 
taking precautions to avoid the event).  Most children intuitively undertake exactly the same thought 
process whenever they contemplate violating a parental rule:  the likelihood of discovery 
(probability), the potential penalty (injury), and the undesirability of foregoing the proposed action 
(i.e., the burden of taking precautions). 
 289. See Robert Frost, The Road Not Taken, in ROBERT FROST’S POEMS 219 (1971). 
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what the vertical choice-of-law doctrine demands.290  They differ only 
on what goes into the balance, not on balancing as the proper technique.  
The balance is sometimes predetermined.  The Supremacy Clause291 
commands that a federal constitutional provision or a valid federal 
statute,292 rule or regulation, tips the scales irretrievably to the side of 
federal law governing.  With respect to the Federal Rules, REA 
determines their validity, and its criterion is that no Federal Rule shall 
“abridge, enlarge or modify” a substantive right.  Thus, a Federal Rule 
that does modify a substantive right does not get into the balance at all 
because of REA, and one need not consult the Supremacy Clause.   
The clash among the Justices concerns the scope of “substantive 
right” and the kind of evaluation in which the Court should engage when 
confronted with an REA question.  Justice Scalia apparently believes 
that unless a Federal Rule purports to affect a substantive right, it is valid 
and applies on its own terms.293  He answers the REA question by 
looking only at the text of the Federal Rule.294  This is analogous to 
challenging the constitutionality of a statute “on its face,” and that is all 
that Justice Scalia thinks REA commands and permits. 
Justice Stevens thinks one should look first at the state rule to 
determine whether it is substantive for REA purposes.295  If he 
characterizes the state rule as procedural, he will look no further, 
upholding the Federal Rule’s application.  If the state rule is substantive, 
he apparently agrees with Justice Ginsburg on the proper course of 
action.  One might therefore view Justice Stevens as closer to Justice 
Scalia on the result in Shady Grove but closer to Justice Ginsburg on 
REA technique more generally. 
Whether the state rule is substantive or procedural, Justice 
Ginsburg also balances, but she reads “substantive” in REA to include 
not only the rules of decision that apply to the claim and defenses on the 
merits or to the parties extra-litigation behavior, but also any entitlement 
that may affect the amount of a judgment that a court can enter against a 
defendant in a single lawsuit.296  Thus, she treats section 901(b) as a 
substantive right although it does not affect the defendant’s total 
 
 290. See generally Doernberg, supra note 11. 
 291. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
 292. Note the Supremacy Clause’s reference to “the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance” of the Constitution.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 293. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1444 
(2010). 
 294. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text. 
 295. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 296. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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exposure to liability.297  Both Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, therefore, 
think that REA contemplates as-applied challenges, for only in that light 
is it necessary to examine the state rules involved.  Thus, Justice Scalia 
thinks that the words of a challenged rule must explicitly abridge, 
enlarge or modify a substantive right to run afoul of REA.  Justice 
Ginsburg thinks REA commands the Court to undertake a far more 
searching, difficult and amorphous examination into whether application 
of the Federal Rule would affect any substantive right that state law 
establishes. 
In my view, this is symptomatic of a phenomenon that has made the 
Erie discussion more difficult:  labeling something “substantive” as a 
shorthand way of saying that state law should govern the issue.  That 
terminology comes from Guaranty Trust’s declaration that a matter was 
“substantive” (i.e., state law should apply) if the choice between state 
and federal law was outcome-determinative.298  That is how state 
statutes of limitation, ordinarily regarded as procedural,299 became 
substantive for Erie purposes.  That was an unnecessary and unfortunate 
shorthand, because it prevented analysis rather than assisting it.  State 
procedural rules often apply in diversity cases.  Statutes of limitations 
are one example; burdens of proof are another.300 
The basic vertical choice-of-law doctrine approach remains what it 
has been.  State rules—substantive or procedural—apply by default 
unless federal law (i.e., a constitutional, statutory or regulatory provision 
or an existing rule of federal common law) displaces them or some 
dominant federal interest requires creating a new common law rule.301  
Justice Ginsburg’s approach to REA would presage a more searching 
(and far more amorphous) examination of state procedural rules to see 
whether they “affect” a party’s substantive rights.302 
Justice Scalia’s approach has the advantages of simplicity and 
predictability.  If a Federal Rule does not address the elements that 
entitle a plaintiff or defendant to prevail on the merits or the parties’ 
extra-litigation behavior, it passes muster under REA.303  Justice 
Stevens’s approach begins at the other end, asking whether the state rule 
 
 297. See supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text. 
 298. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945). 
 299. See supra notes 30, 103, 153 and accompanying text. 
 300. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.  See infra note 305 and accompanying text. 
 301. A federal common law rule would thereafter govern in the state courts as well, by reason 
of supremacy.  See supra note 185.  See generally Doernberg, supra note 11. 
 302. Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1471 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 303. Id. at 1443 (Scalia, J., for himself, the Chief Justice, and Justices Thomas and Sotomayor). 
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addresses substance or procedure.304  He admits that the inquiry will not 
always be an easy one, noting that even rules designated as procedural 
may have substantive purposes and effects.305  That is one of the 
 
 304. Id. at 1449 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 305. Id. at 1453 n.8 (“I would apply [REA] . . . allowing for the possibility that a state rule that 
regulates something traditionally considered to be procedural might actually define a substantive 
right.  Justice Scalia’s objection, moreover, misses the key point:  In some instances, a state rule that 
appears procedural really is not.  A rule about how damages are reviewed on appeal may really be a 
damages cap.  See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 427, 116 S. Ct. 2211.  A rule that a plaintiff can bring a 
claim for only three years may really be a limit on the existence of the right to seek redress.  A rule 
that a claim must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt may really be a definition of the scope of the 
claim.  These are the sorts of rules that one might describe as ‘procedural,’ but they nonetheless 
define substantive rights.  Thus, if a federal rule displaced such a state rule, the federal rule would 
have altered the State’s ‘substantive rights.’”).  Justice Stevens overstates his point.  First, the 
reference to Gasperini is misleading.  The Court found N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c) (McKinney 1995 & 
Supp. 2010) to be both substantive and procedural.  It applied the substantive part but not the 
procedural part.  See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.  His preceding statement about “a 
state rule that regulates something traditionally considered to be procedural” connotes that a cap on 
damages is in that category, but it is not.  Damages caps are substantive, and federal courts must 
apply state caps unless some dominant federal interest calls for displacement.  There has not been 
such a case. 
  His reference to limitations periods sometimes being substantive is correct, subject to the 
analysis of Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Co., 220 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1955).  See supra notes 103, 
153.  The phenomenon occurs, but it does not occur often.  Finally, I respectfully disagree with 
Justice Stevens that a burden of proof is substantive.  It may have an important effect on 
adjudicating substantive rights, but it is not itself substantive.  The Court’s closest discussion of 
burdens’ status came in In re Winship: 
The requirement that guilt of a criminal charge be established by proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt dates at least from our early years as a Nation.  The demand for a 
higher degree of persuasion in criminal cases was recurrently expressed from ancient 
times, [though] its crystallization into the formula “beyond a reasonable doubt” seems to 
have occurred as late as 1798.  It is now accepted in common law jurisdictions as the 
measure of persuasion by which the prosecution must convince the trier of all the 
essential elements of guilt.  C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 321 (1954); see also 9 J. 
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2497 (3d ed. 1940).  Although virtually unanimous adherence 
to the reasonable-doubt standard in common-law jurisdictions may not conclusively 
establish it as a requirement of due process, such adherence does “reflect a profound 
judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice administered.”  
397 U.S. 358, 361-62 (1970) (citations omitted).  Winship reflects the importance the Court 
attached to the burden.  Far from classifying it as substantive, however, the Court spoke of it as a 
method of adjudication, not a rule of decision.  The original Rules Enabling Act, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 
1064, 1064 (1934), discussed the right of trial by jury in a separate section from REA’s “abridge, 
enlarge” language.  See supra note 184.  Section 1 contained the substantive rights limitation, but 
Congress addressed the jury trial right in § 2.  It thus clearly did not regard the entitlement to a jury 
trial as a substantive right, and it is hard to believe that it would have felt differently about burdens 
of proof. 
  I recognize that I am squarely in conflict with a declaration in Palmer v. Hoffman:  
Respondent contends in the first place that the charge was correct because of the fact that 
Rule 8(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure makes contributory negligence an affirmative 
defense.  We do not agree.  Rule 8(c) covers only the manner of pleading.  The question 
of the burden of establishing contributory negligence is a question of local law which 
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difficulties with his position, because he does not set out a method for 
analyzing state rules in making that determination.  Asking only whether 
a rule may have a substantive effect is not helpful. 
The Court is quite right in stating that the  
“outcome-determinative” test of Guaranty Trust . . . . if taken literally, 
proves too much, for any rule, no matter how clearly “procedural,” can 
affect the outcome of litigation if it is not obeyed. . . .  To my mind the 
proper line of approach in determining whether to apply a state or a 
federal rule, whether “substantive” or “procedural,” is to stay close to 
basic principles by inquiring if the choice of rule would substantially 
affect those primary decisions respecting human conduct which our 
constitutional system leaves to state regulation.306 
Justice Harlan rejected what he saw as the majority’s rigid 
approach.307  I think Justice Harlan was correct, but a bit too narrow and 
insufficiently specific.  He thought that REA focused on preventing the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure from affecting the laws under which 
people lived their everyday lives (rules of personal conduct), entered 
into commercial transactions (rules of contract) and conducted 
themselves to avoid harming others (rules of torts).  To him, REA 
limited the Federal Rules to regulating the conduct of litigation in the 
 
federal courts in diversity of citizenship cases must apply. 
318 U.S. 109, 117 (1943).  Justice Douglas’s statement regarding the burden of proof in the state-
created negligence claim in Palmer was the equivalent of declaring it substantive for Erie purposes.  
He borrowed directly from Erie’s language with his reference to “local law.”  See Erie R.R. Co. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 70, 74 & n.8.  This does nothing so much as to demonstrate again the 
functional inutility of the labels “substantive” and “procedural.”  See WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 
286, § 59, at 401 (“A particular issue may be classified as substantive or procedural in determining 
whether it is within the scope of a court’s rulemaking power, or in resolving questions of conflict of 
laws, or in determining whether to apply state or federal.  These are three very different kinds of 
problems.  Factors that are of decisive importance in making the classification for one purpose may 
be irrelevant for another.  To use the same name for all three purposes is an invitation to a barren 
and misleading conceptualism. . . .”).  I am in conflict, however, only with the Court’s stated reason, 
not with its result.    No Federal Rule addresses burdens of proof.  The matter then becomes one of 
Byrd balancing.  With respect to a state-created claim or defense, there is no dominant federal 
interest in having a different burden of proof, so the state rule would apply by default.  See supra 
text accompanying note 301; Doernberg, supra note 11, at 644-49.  Professor Ely argued that the 
Court was correct to regard burdens of proof as substantive for REA purposes, but he also took the 
position that Congress could certainly legislate burdens of proof to apply in diversity cases because 
such matters are procedural and within Congress’s legislative power to create and manage the 
federal courts.  Ely, supra note 9, at 706-07 n.77.  It is REA, not the Constitution, that prevents the 
Supreme Court from achieving that result through the Federal Rules. 
 306. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 307. See supra note 184. 
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federal courts rather than conduct outside of and antecedent to 
litigation.308 
I disagree with his implication that REA was only (or even 
primarily) intended as an instrument of federalism, particularly 
protecting state substantive rights from Federal Rules encroachment.309  
REA does not limit itself to state-created substantive rights.  If REA 
were an instrument of federalism, one might expect to see some 
reference to state law.  One must therefore take REA’s language to refer 
to substantive rights irrespective of the sovereign authority that creates 
them.  REA antedated Erie by four years, so it is highly unlikely that 
Congress designed it to serve Erie’s purposes.310  REA almost certainly 
was a separation-of-powers limitation,311 with Congress protecting its 
 
 308. See, for example, his reference to “a debilitating uncertainty in the planning of everyday 
affairs. . . .”  Hanna, 380 U.S. at 474 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 309. Professor Ely also saw REA as a statement of federalism.  See Ely, supra note 9, at 718.  
In taking that position, he linked REA and RDA as “directed to the same general concern—
protection of the prerogatives of state law. . . .”  Ely, supra note 9, at 718.  He does concede that 
there is “no evidence” that the Congress that enacted REA was thinking about RDA.  Ely, supra 
note 9, at 721.  Although Ely is accurate about the current understanding of RDA, there is evidence 
that the 1789 Congress was focused not on state prerogatives, but rather on the importance of 
applying American rather than English law.  See generally WILFRED RITZ, REWRITING THE 
HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789 (1990). 
 310. Sain v. City of Bend, 309 F.3d 1134, 1137 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Burbank, supra note 
35).  (The Ninth Circuit’s opinion specifies Professor Burbank’s article and gives the title correctly.  
The citation in the Federal Reporter, however, is “135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987),” which refers to 
Steven N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).  Professor 
Subrin’s article, however, does not discuss the point for which the court seems to have cited 
Professor Burbank.) 
  One should not forget that the Court’s decision in Erie came as a shock; no one had 
anticipated it.  See, e.g., Deborah Lynn Bassett, The Forum Game, 84 N.C. L. REV. 333, 356 
(2006); Richard Danzig, Justice Frankfurter’s Opinions in the Flag Salute Cases:  Blending Logic 
and Psychologic in Constitutional Decisionmaking, 36 STAN. L. REV. 675, 684 (1984).  Justice 
Butler’s opinion confirmed that:  “No constitutional question was suggested or argued below or 
here.”  Erie, 304 U.S. at 82 (Butler, J., concurring in the result). 
 311. Presumably, REA would also forbid a Federal Rule from abridging, enlarging or 
modifying a right created by a foreign sovereign, although I can find no cases discussing that.  
Additionally, note that the original Rules Enabling Act, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064 (1934) refers to 
“the substantive rights of any litigant” at § 1.  In § 2, after permitting the Supreme Court to unite the 
procedural rules of law and equity, REA specified, “Provided, however, That in such union of rules 
the right of trial by jury as at common law and declared by the seventh amendment to the 
Constitution shall be preserved to the parties inviolate.”  This demonstrates that Congress was at 
least (though perhaps not exclusively) thinking of federal rights when it passed REA, because the 
Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, had not then (and still has not) incorporated the 
Seventh Amendment right to jury trial into the Due Process Clause.  See JOHN E. NOWAK & 
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10.2, at 397-98 (7th ed. 2004) (“Of the first eight 
Amendments the Supreme Court has held explicitly that only three of the individual guarantees are 
inapplicable to the states.  The three unincorporated guarantees are:  (1) the Second Amendment 
guarantee of the right to bear arms [but see McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020 
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role as the source of federal rights and master of their scope.  It may 
have been instructing the Supreme Court, as the promulgator of the 
Federal Rules, to keep its procedural hands off congressionally-created 
substantive rights.  Whether or not one agrees with this interpretation, 
REA’s language may contemplate the explicitness approach:  whether a 
procedural rule would formally “abridge, enlarge or modify” a 
substantive right.312  As Justices Scalia313 and Harlan314 have noted, 
relying broadly on a procedural rule’s effect on litigation can make 
almost any procedural rule look substantive. 
Professor Burbank’s examination of REA315 discussed REA’s 
purposes at some length.  He concluded: 
Nothing could be clearer from the pre-1934 history of the Rules 
Enabling Act than that the procedure/substance dichotomy in the first 
two sentences was intended to allocate lawmaking power between the 
Supreme Court as rulemaker and Congress.  The pre-1934 history also 
makes clear that the protection of state law was deemed a probable 
effect, rather than the purpose of, a limitation designed to allocate 
lawmaking power between federal institutions.316 
Thus, Professor Burbank criticized the Sibbach Court for linking 
REA’s concern with substantive rights to constitutional limitations on 
federal power and concern for state-created rights.317  He denied that 
Congress had any such purpose.318  “It is difficult to find even a trace of 
concern that the uniform federal procedure bill might lead to an 
inappropriate displacement of state law in any of the reports and other 
material produced by its ABA sponsors during the long campaign” for 
its adoption,319 which he noted lasted twenty years.320 
 
(2010) (incorporating the Second Amendment)]; (2) the Fifth Amendment clause guaranteeing 
criminal prosecution only on a grand jury indictment; and (3) the Seventh Amendment guarantee of 
a jury trial in a civil case.” (footnotes omitted)).  It also connotes that Congress did not view the 
right to jury trial as substantive, because then there would have been no need to protect it separately. 
 312. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006). 
 313. See supra text accompanying note 82. 
 314. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
 315. Burbank, supra note 35. 
 316. Id. at 1106. 
 317. Id. at 1108. 
 318. Id. at 1109-10 (“It is not surprising that the preservation of state law, as such, was not a 
primary concern when the Act was formulated or when it was passed.  Even in 1934, Erie was four 
years away.  In the 1920’s, Swift v. Tyson was in full bloom, and Erie was considered by most to be 
an impossibility.  Moreover, the Federal Rules contemplated by the Act were to apply in all civil 
actions tried in federal court, including those in which federal law furnished the rule of decision.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 319. Id. at 1111. 
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If Professor Burbank’s analysis is correct, then the Court’s 
tendency to view the limitation of REA as sensitivity to federalism 
issues is misplaced.  That then requires consideration of what REA did 
intend to make “out of bounds” for Supreme Court rule-making.  Here it 
is important to note again REA’s words in 1934:  “neither abridge, 
enlarge nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant.”321 
There is a certain ambiguity in those words.  Does REA bar rules 
that explicitly change a substantive right (the explicitness approach) or 
does it mean, more expansively, that no Federal Rule should affect a 
substantive right (which I shall refer to as the affective approach, 
borrowing from Justice Ginsburg’s “outcome affective” language in 
Shady Grove322)?  The latter seems unlikely, not least because “affect” 
as a standard is hopelessly vague, and any procedural rule may affect a 
substantive right.  Hanna appears to support this position.323  But there 
are better ways to ask the question324 that enmesh one less in the murky 
vocabulary of “substance” and “procedure,” which, as Justice 
Frankfurter pointed out, has little analytical value in the abstract.325 
That is why I urge shifting the focus of the REA inquiry to whether 
the vertical choice-of-law decision concerns a rule having the purpose of 
regulating extra-litigation conduct or otherwise affecting people in the 
non-litigation world326—the behavioral approach.327  The focus should 
 
 320. Id. at 1023-24.  See also Steven N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law:  The 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 909 (1987) 
(“After almost twenty-five years of battle, Congress passed the Enabling Act of 1934. . . .”). 
 321. Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064.  See supra note 50.  
 322. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431,1471 
(2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  See supra text accompanying notes 133-34. 
 323. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965) (“Congress’ prohibition of any alteration of 
substantive rights of litigants was obviously not addressed to such incidental effects as necessarily 
attend the adoption of the prescribed new rules of procedure upon the rights of litigants who, 
agreeably to rules of practice and procedure, have been brought before a court authorized to 
determine their rights.”). 
 324. See supra notes 216-221 and accompanying text. 
 325. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945) (“Matters of ‘substance’ and matters 
of ‘procedure’ are much talked about in the books as though they defined a great divide cutting 
across the whole domain of law.  But, of course, ‘substance’ and ‘procedure’ are the same key-
words to very different problems.  Neither substance’ nor ‘procedure’ represents the same 
invariants.  Each implies different variables depending upon the particular problem for which it is 
used.”). 
 326. I use this phrase because I recognize, for example, that some rules intend to affect the way 
people feel, the prime example being a statute of limitations’ goal of repose, as Professor Ely noted.  
See Ely, supra note 9, at 726.  He also used the example of immunity doctrines, which in the case of 
government officials, for example, may have the purpose of removing from officials exercising 
discretionary power the constant worry of being sued if someone disagrees with their exercise of 
discretion.  See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-19 (1982). 
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be on non-litigation-conduct regulation.  This approach includes, but 
does not limit itself to, the elements approach, which would consider 
only the elements of the cause of action (e.g., whether there was an offer 
to contract, an acceptance, legally sufficient consideration and 
performance on the part of the plaintiff) and the elements of merits 
defenses (e.g., whether the contract violates the Statute of Frauds).  
There are ostensibly procedural rules on the state level that exist for the 
purpose of furthering some substantive goal, and the intensity of more 
than two centuries328 of debate over federalism suggests caution in 
federal law displacing state law. 
Neither Rule 23 nor section 901(b) addresses those things.  To take 
as broad a view of “substantive” as the dissent urged would require the 
conclusion that Congress prescribed the affective approach, a hopelessly 
unbounded standard reminiscent of the now-discarded Guaranty Trust 
outcome-determinative rule.  The Court ultimately rejected that 
approach,329 perhaps recognizing that continued application would 
qualify the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the EPA’s Endangered 
Species List.330  Hanna recognized that the true Erie choice-of-law 
questions pose considerable difficulties; that is why it spoke of “the 
typical, relatively unguided Erie [c]hoice.”331  That connotes that the 
REA question is not so amorphous, and it should not be.  Focusing on 
either whether a rule is extra-litigation conduct-regulating (the 
behavioral approach) or whether it goes to the merits of the dispute (the 
elements approach) will help to make that view a reality.  Either 
approach offers a different and more comprehensible method of 
analyzing REA problems than the Court now has. 
Looking at Shady Grove in light of Justice Harlan’s distinction 
between substantive and procedural rights suggests that the Court 
reached the right result.  The “substantive right” on which Justice 
Ginsburg rested her dissent is in reality only procedural.  Section 901(b) 
 
 327. The elements approach is a good second choice, but it gives less leeway to state’s interest 
in regulating extra-litigation conduct.  Nonetheless, I suggest it would do a better—and clearer—job 
than the Justices’ current approaches. 
 328. I mark the debate as having begun in 1787 at the Constitutional Convention, though I 
suppose one could take the discussion of the Articles of Confederation as the starting point.  The 
important thing, however, is that the debate continues (witness Shady Grove) and is likely to 
continue indefinitely. 
 329. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537-38 (1958). 
 330. See FRIEDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER, supra note 27, § 4.3, at 212.  See also WRIGHT & 
KANE, supra note 286, § 59, at 403 (“Many observers believed [after the 1949 trio] . . . that there 
was no longer much, if any, room for independent federal regulation of procedure.”). 
 331. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965). 
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concerns the conduct of litigation, not anything outside the court house.  
Justice Ginsburg’s own figures332 illustrate the point.  The damages 
Shady Grove could collect individually were apparently in the vicinity of 
$500.333  Suppose that Allstate (as Shady Grove charged) routinely paid 
claims late, and that it did so with respect to $500 claims from 10,000 
beneficiaries. The total amount of liability Allstate would face would be 
the $5,000,000 that Justice Ginsburg mentioned.  Nothing in New York 
law shields Allstate from having to pay out all $5,000,000.  The only 
thing section 901(b) says is that it takes more than a single lawsuit for 
that to occur.  With all respect to Justice Ginsburg, section 901(b) makes 
no effort to regulate “the primary conduct and affairs” of the citizenry.  
It certainly does not invest Allstate with any right to pay claims late. 
At the end of the day, Shady Grove generates much heat but sheds 
little light on how to approach REA problems, and that is unfortunate,334 
because the Justices missed an opportunity to lift at least some of the 
analytical fog that has shrouded the area for so long.  They still balance.  
They differ about what goes into the REA-prescribed balance, and they 
may differ in particular cases on which way the balance tips, but they do 
not differ on the technique they use.  I think they ultimately will come to 
the conclusion that the affective approach is neither true to Congress’s 
purpose nor certain enough to apply with any consistency from case to 
case.335  Justice Scalia’s approach is far more certain, but it rejects the 
idea that one should look at the state rule in evaluating whether the 
choice-of-law dispute concerns matters of substance or procedure within 
the meaning of REA.  Justice Stevens’s approach may end up being the 
best, although it leaves the judiciary short of a way to make the decision 
even when it does focus on the state rule.  That is what either the 
elements approach or the behavioral approach supplies. 
Finally, one should keep in mind how few cases have come to the 
Court’s attention, and how few are likely to, concerning an ostensibly 
 
 332. See supra text accompanying note 110. 
 333. See supra note 70. 
 334. Scholars have long lamented the Court’s inability to develop a consensus of interpretation.  
See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Dennis Murashko, The Rules Enabling Act and the Procedural-
Substantive Tension:  A Lesson in Statutory Interpretation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 26, 27 (2008) 
(referring to “this troubling state of affairs” and the problems it has engendered); Leslie M. 
Kelleher, Taking “Substantive Rights” (in the Rules Enabling Act) More Seriously, 74 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 47, 49 (1998) (“Despite the passage of more than six decades, neither the Court nor 
the commentators have managed to produce a workable definition of the ‘substantive rights’ 
limitation.”). 
 335. To borrow vocabulary from the Court’s political-question doctrine, one might even ask 
whether the affective approach is a “judicially discoverable and manageable standard[ ] for 
resolving . . .” REA questions.  Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993). 
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procedural state rule that may have a purposeful substantive effect 
relating to either the merits of the case or the parties’ extra-litigation 
conduct.  For those few that do reach the Court, however, and for the 
many cases that do not, the choice-of-law discussion would benefit from 
a better way to distinguish conduct-regulating rules from litigation-
regulating rules.  Focusing on either the elements of claims and defenses 
on the merits or on whether a rule aims to influence non-litigation 
behavior would be far more useful and understandable than continuing 
to bandy the unhelpful terminology of substance and procedure.  To 
borrow again from the Bard, future cases involving the legitimacy of a 
Federal Rule under REA may demonstrate that Shady Grove ultimately 
was “full of sound and fury, [s]ignifying nothing.”336 
 
 336. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, act 5, sc. 5.  I hasten to add, however, that I in no 
way suggest that Shady Grove is “a tale told by . . . idiot[s].”  Id. 
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